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Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or
Should We Care?
"Mirror, mirror on the wall, Who is the fairest of them all?"
CHARLES M. ELSON*
Following the Delaware Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,l investment bankers' fairness opinions have become almost as
ubiquitous a part of the American financial landscape as fast food is to the
American highway. Although certainly a popular tool for corporate directors
seeking justification and insulation from liability for certain business decisions
prior to Van Gorkom, fairness opinions have, since that ruling, become a
necessary element in all sorts of corporate control transactions, including tender
offers, mergers, sales of assets, stock repurchases, and leveraged buyouts.2 As
the numbers of these opinions have proliferated, so has the revenue they
produce for the large investment banking houses. Frequently the opinion is
issued in conjunction with a number of other services the bank renders in
connection with a control transaction. Fees for these activities have escalated
significantly in recent years and can well exceed many millions of dollars. 3 As
the significance of the wealth transfers to the banks that these fairness opinions
occasion has increased, so have the demands for bank liability and
accountability from those groups of securities holders whose actions these
opinions are designed to influence. If the banks are to receive such large fees
for their services, the holders argue, should they not then be held accountable
to the holders for inaccuracies contained in their opinions?
* Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law; A.B. Harvard University,
1981; J.D. University of Virginia, 1985. The author acknowledges the most helpful
comments of Professors Alfred Conard, Michael Dooley, E. Allan Farnsworth, Saul
Levmore, Jonathan Macey, and Michael Swygert. He additionally thanks Bill Cook, Greg
Holland, Reg Stambaugh, and Gene Williams for their excellant research assistance.
1488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are 7iey and
What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 27 & nn. 1-8.
3 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Traditionally, bank liability for misstatement or omissions was as difficult
for a holder to obtain as winning the state lottery. Because these opinions were
generally addressed to the company's board of directors, the holders had no
contractual action against the banks. Under a similar privity doctrine, an action
grounded in tort was also unavailable. 4 The holder's only recourse was under
the federal securities laws which the courts interpreted as requiring proof of
scienter for liability for misstatements-certainly no easy task. If a fairness
opinion was inaccurate, unless some sort of "evil" intent was demonstrated, the
shareholder was out of luck.
Recently, however, on the basis of several court rulings, the tide may be
turning in the shareholders' favor. In a widely publicized and highly
controversial 1987 case, Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.,5 a
New York court, by liberalizing notions of privity, revived the once moribund
state law tort of negligent misrepresentation and decreed its application to suits
by shareholders for inaccuracies contained in investment bank fairness
opinions. Other courts soon followed suit6 and momentum began to develop
judicially for a new negligence standard of liability for fairness opinions. A
lower standard of liability, of course, means a greater shareholder rate of
success in actions brought on inaccurate opinions. The reasoning, put most
simplistically, would seem to be that if the banks are paid huge fees to form
opinions that act to insulate corporate directors from liability and have reason
to know that others, obviously the shareholders, will rely on their opinions in
deciding what action to take regarding corporate control transactions, then the
opinion renderers should, as de facto "insurers," be willing to stand behind
their opinions. If they are wrong, they should pay. Such a regime would
produce a strong deterrent effect and lead to better and more accurate opinions.
This argument for extending liability, though having a seeming moral and
logical appeal, is fatally flawed. It will lead to judicial confusion, increased
transaction costs and unfortunately, fairness opinions of dubious value that will
provide no better basis for informed shareholder action than before. This
Article will critique this new standard on economic and juridical grounds. It
will suggest that no extension of liability is warranted.
The solution to the perceived problem of innocent shareholders relying to
their detriment on inaccurate fairness opinions lies not in holding the bankers
liable. The entire process of "independent" valuation is inherently suspect.
Fairness opinions, this Article will argue, are inherently unfair. No process or
4 See infra notes 81-132 and accompanying text.
5 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8
(N.Y. 1988).
6 See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990); Klein
v. King, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990); Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (extending liability to the bankers on a novel agency theory).
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judicially created liability scheme can make them "fair." Structural
considerations inherent in the way these opinions are formed prevent accurate
valuation. Only the marketplace can determine what price is "fair" and what is
not.
Indeed, the whole concept of price "fairness" is in and of itself a
misnomer. There is really no such thing as a "fair" price. Fairness in the
financial context is a fundamentally elusive concept. What to one person is an
asset of great monetary value may to another be utterly worthless. Value is
simply at what price level one individual, given all the facts necessary to permit
an informed decision, is willing to buy or sell a particular asset at a particular
point in time. In the broader sense, that is exactly what the marketplace itself
does when it is asked to value a business. If the price offered is acceptable to
them, the market participants will act. Their acceptance of a particular price
demonstrates that they felt that the price was "fair" to them at that given point
in time. Is this action determinative of fundamental fairness? No. There is in
financial valuation no such thing as "faimess"-only price acceptability. This is
the entire problem with judicial concern over price "fairness." Fairness is
simply individual price acceptability-it is not capable of uniform definition or
application-at least not in the financial context. The price that market
participants are willing to accept will vary with time and circumstance. The
perceived, and judicially supported, "requirement" of a fairness opinion is thus
unwarranted and only leads to increased transaction costs that are ultimately
borne by the shareholder with no corresponding benefit. Fairness opinions
exist, not as an aid to shareholder decisionmaking, but only as an insulator of
director liability. Consequently, they should no longer be considered by the
courts as an integral part of a prudent director's decisionmaking process in a
corporate control transaction. They do not result in the protection of
shareholder wealth. The market is the best arbiter of acceptable value and
protector of shareholder interests, not an investment bank retained by and
beholden to the board of directors. Liability must follow economic reality-
economic reality must not precede liability.
Part I of this Article discusses the composition of the fairness opinion
itself. It examines the ever-fluctuating processes for determining "fair" value
and the historical importance of such evaluations to a variety of financial
transactions. It discusses the problem of "independent" evaluation when
investment banks operate in a practical environment in which such
independence is structurally virtually impossible.
Part II examines the traditional liability imposed on investment banks by
the federal securities laws for inaccuracies contained in fairness opinions. It
then examines the historical evolution of the tort of negligent misrepresentation
and how the liberalization of notions of privity led first to its application to
accountants for misstatements in audited financial statements and then, rather
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logically, to another group of independent arbiters of value-investment
bankers.
Part III critiques this new development on economic and juridical grounds.
It argues that application of a negligence standard of care to these opinions,
from an economic standpoint, will lead to more expensive and less informative
opinions. The reduction in available information will lead to a less informed
shareholder universe. Additionally, from a juridical standpoint, when so many
accepted alternative valuation processes exist, each yielding widely differing
results, it will be almost impossible for a court to formulate the "reasonable
investment banker" standard necessary to determine either negligent conduct or
the lack thereof. A rigid standard may lead a court to find either universal
negligence or universal reasonable conduct-certainly an undesirable and
unproductive result. Thus, this section concludes that the imposition of
"negligence" liability on banks for improperly drawn fairness opinions by way
of the tort of negligent misrepresentation is an ineffectual and even counter-
productive process.
Finally, Part IV recommends a more equitable and economically sound
approach to fairness opinions. Rather than attempting to define some rigid
standard for the production of such opinions, which, as Part I argues, is a futile
effort in any event, the "requirement" and consequent negligent liability
standard should be abandoned entirely and market forces themselves be
employed to evaluate "fairness." This will not, of course, elininate the use of
the fairness opinion entirely, but will result in the information contained therein
being available to the market at a lower cost, which investors may accept or
reject as they see fit-which probably occurs anyway under the present regime,
but because of liability concerns, at exorbitant prices.
I. THE VALUATION PROCESS
Under the business judgment rule, a corporate board of directors is
protected from liability to the company's shareholders for a detrimental
business decision if that board can demonstrate that the decision was made in
good faith, in an informed manner and was rationally based.7 Generally, the
7 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1983), in which the Delaware
Supreme Court described the business judgment rule as:
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interest... of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish
facts rebutting the presumption.
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critical question today before a court considering whether to afford a board the
protection offered by the rule concerns whether that board was properly
"informed" in making the decision at issue. To meet this "informed"
requirement, a board is entitled to rely on the opinions of a varied collection of
business "experts" as to matters the directors reasonably believe to be within
their professional competence. 8
Considered to have expertise in financial valuation, 9 investment bankers
have for years been called upon by corporate directors to render advice
Id. at 812 (citations omitted). Illustrating a shift in the business judgment rule from a judicial
composition to a legislative codification is The American Law Institute-Principles of
Corporate Governance which reads, in pertinent part:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his
duty under this Section if-
(1) he is not interested... in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the extent
he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interest of the
corporation.
The American Law Institute-PRINCiPLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1991).
8 The American Law Institute-Pinciples of Corporate Governance states:
In performing his duty and functions, a director or officer who acts in good faith, and
reasonably believes that his reliance is warranted, is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports, statements (including financial statements and other financial data),
decisions, judgments, and performance ... prepared, presented, made, or performed
by:
(a) One or more directors, officers, or employees of the corporation, or of a business
organization... under joint control or common control ... with the corporation, who
the director or officer reasonably believes merit confidence; or
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants, engineers, or other persons who the director or
officer reasonably believes merit confidence.
The American Law Institute-PRicIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.02 (rent.
Draft No. 11, 1991).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT L. KUHN, INvESTMENT BANKING 97-123 (1990) (surveying
valuation methods utilized by investment bankers); Leonard Chazen, Fairness From a
Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "77drd-Party Sale Value"
the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1442 (1981) (investment bankers are
recognized as "qualified professionals" in valuing securities); Citron v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 512 (Del. Ch. 1990) (defendant Board committee entitled
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concerning the financial appropriateness of various kinds of corporate control
transactions. In rendering such advice, usually in the form of a "fairness
opinion," which is generally a short letter to the board opining that the
transaction is "fair" from a financial standpoint, 10 the banker acts to aid the
to rely on Salomon Brothers for "expert financial advice" on fairness of merger price
valuation).
10 An illustrative and rather typical example of such was that rendered by the bankers
engaged to evaluate the fairness of the RJR/Nabisco leveraged buyout. Lazard Freres and
Dillon Read each produced fairness opinions. The language of the two opinions is identical:
Gentlemen and Madam:
We have acted as financial advisor to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors
of RJR Nabisco, Inc. (the "Company") in connection with its review of recent proposals to
acquire the Company. In connection therewith, you have requested our opinion as to the
fairness, from a financial point of view, of the consideration to be received by holders of
common stock without par value ("Common Stock"), including the Associated Preferred
Stock Purchase Rights, and Series B Cumulative Preferred Stock without par value ("Series
B Preferred Stock") of the Company in connection with the proposed acquisition (the
"Acquisition") of the Company by RJR Holdings Corp. ("Holdings"), a corporation
organized by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co....
In arriving at our opinion, we have, among other things: (i) reviewed the terms of the
Acquisition and of the acquisition proposals received from a group organized by certain
members of the management of the Company, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. and Salomon
Brothers Inc., and a group organized by The First Boston Corporation and Resource
Holdings Associates, (ii) reviewed certain business, and historical financial, information
relating to the Company, (iii) reviewed certain financial forecasts and other data provided to
us by the Company relating to the business and prospects of the Company, (iv) conducted
discussions with members of the senior management of the Company with respect to the
business and prospects of the Company, (v) reviewed publicly available financial and
stockmarket data with respect to certain other companies in lines of business we believe to
be generally comparable to the Company, (vi) reviewed the historical market prices and
trading volumes of the Common Stock and the Series B Preferred Stock and of certain other
securities, (vii) reviewed the terms of certain recent acquisition transactions, including
business combinations, which we believe to be generally comparable to the Acquisition,
(viii) conducted discussions with Holdings and certain of its financial advisors and financing
sources with repsect to the Acquisition, (ix) reviewed current market conditions, including
the markets for securities comparable to the Exchangeable Preferred Stock and Converting
Debentures, and (x) conducted such other financial studies, analyses and investigations, and
considered such other information, as we deemed necessary or appropriate.
We have relied upon the accuracy and completeness of the financial and other
information regarding the Company provided to us, and have not independently verified
any such information. With respect to the financial forecasts referred to above, we have
assumed that they have been reasonably prepared on bases reflecting the best currently
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directors in meeting the requirement that the board acted in an informed
manner. Once this requirement has been met, provided the other two steps of
the business judgment rule have been complied with, the Board is protected
from liability to the company's shareholders no matter how disastrous the
decision turns out to be.
Investment banks have been providing this liability-precluding "advice" for
a number of years and courts have been receptive to the concept.'1 The use of
available estimates and judgements of the Company's management as to the future financial
performance of the Company. In addition, we have not made any independent evaluation or
appraisal of any of the assets or liabilities (contingent or otherwise) of the Company.
Further, our opinion is based on economic, monetary and market conditions existing on the
date hereof.
Based upon and subject to the foregoing, it is our opinion that as of the date
hereof, the consideration to be received in the Acquisition is fair, from a financial point of
view, to the holders of each of the Common Stock and Series B Preferred Stock.
Very truly yours,
Lazard Freres & Co./Dillon Read
RJR Nabisco, Proxy Statement, Apr. 5, 1989, at Annex II, available in LEXIS, Company
library, Proxy file [hereinafter RJR Proxy Statement].
11 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir. 1981)
(reliance on outside experts including investment banker a factor in finding that directors
satisfied business judgment rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (fairness opinion evaluating merger proposal
a significant indicator of directors' good faith); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634
F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting defendant's reliance upon financial analyst in denying'
plaintiff's claim that directors acted in bad faith); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (Del.
Ch. 1960) (reliance on outside experts element in finding lack of misconduct); Alpert v. 28
Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 27 (N.Y. 1984) (fairness opinion may comprise good
proof that freeze-out price is fair); Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., N.Y. L.J., Dec.
7, 1977, at 7, cols. 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1977) (retention of independent financial
analyst's advice prior to launching tender offer significant factor in determining that
directors fulfilled fiduciary duties). Commentators have also noted the prevalent use of
fairness opinions. Professor Chazen has stated:
Fairness opinions have become so much a part of the routine of public company
acquisitions that today the absence of such an opinion... would probably raise
eyebrows .... An investment banker's opinion on financial fairness may be influential
with a court which reviews the fairness of the acquisition [and] ... a fairness opinion
may protect the acquired company['s] directors against a lawsuit charging that they
failed to exercise reasonable business judgment when they approved the acquisition.
1992]
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such expert advice aids a court in its determination that the directors have met
their fiduciary responsibilities. Of course, directors also use these opinions to
aid their efforts to achieve shareholder support for their actions, 12 but the
primary goal appears to be liability limitation. 13
Although the use of fairness opinions in various forms of corporate control
transactions was not infrequent prior to 1985, following the Delaware Supreme
Court's expansive ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom14 in March of that year, such
reports essentially became a legal necessity. Although the court explicitly stated
in that case that fairness opinions were not "required as a matter of law," 15 still
the fact that the court imposed liability on a board which failed to obtain such
an opinion and indicated that procurement of such an opinion would have
insulated the directors from liability, suggested the imposition of an informal
"requirement." In short, the use of such an opinion would have supported a
finding of the board's informed business judgment which was necessary to
preclude liability.16 Thus, following Van Gorkom, prudent corporate counsel
mandated the acquisition of a fairness opinion in corporate control transactions
Chazen, supra note 9, at 1442. Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 13e-3
requiring issuers to state the fairness of a going private transaction as it pertains to
unaffiliated security holders and to disclose any investment banker's fairness opinions. See,
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1992) & SEC Schedule 13e-3, Items 8 & 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
100 (1992).
12 This purpose is particularly conspicuous in those instances in which a fairness
opinion is provided to the shareholders in their proxy materials. See, e.g., Wells v.
Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988) (management buyout); Dowling v.
Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990) (sale of assets); see also,
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control
Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 123 (1986) ("[A] use of fairness opinions is to persuade
shareholders to tender their shares or to approve the terms of a merger .... This
representation by an investment bank can have a substantial impact on the shareholders
decision."); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fireboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974)
(fairness opinion contributed persuasive support to management-backed transaction); Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) (central purpose of fairness opinion
was convincing shareholders of fairness of price offered).
13 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 28; Bevis Longstreth, Fairness of
Management Buy-outs Needs Evaluation, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1983, at 15, 20
("[Flairness opinions... are much more effective in protecting management than in
assuring the shareholder 'the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.'").
14 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
15 Id. at 876.
16 See Id. at 876-78; see also Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, Investnent
Banker Opinions and Directors' Right to Rely, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1988, at 5; Giuffra,
supra note 12, at 119-20; Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (board's reliance
on advice of investment banker aided finding of good faith and reasonable investigation);
Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 512 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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as a vital prophylactic measure for the board. It is therefore not surprising that
the number of opinions rendered proliferated. 17
If the fairness opinion is to provide the necessary "back-up" to a board's
decision, the process by which that opinion was formed must necessarily be
well-reasoned and honestly and properly performed. The processes for
determining fair value are varied, however, and structural factors implicit in the
environment in which investment banks operate, impact on the degree of
"fairness" of any opinion rendered.
In the fairness opinion formulation process, investment bankers are called
upon by corporate boards to opine as to the fairness, from a financial point of
view, of a given transaction that the board desires to approve. If a uniform
definition of fairness or a uniformly accepted process for testing and
determining fairness existed, the bankers' task would be relatively
straightforward and criticism of any deviation from that definition or process
would be easily formulated. As a number of commentators have noted,
however, no such uniform approach exists. Critiques of the varied approaches
to valuation are as numerous as the techniques themselves.18
The first problem, as Professors Bebchuk and Kahan have pointed out, is
definitional. There exists "conceptual confusion about the definition of fair
price." 19 No person nor court has formulated a precise, uniform definition of
fair price. What is "fair" definitionally, varies from transaction to transaction.
How one defines fairness in one transaction will greatly affect what price may
be considered fair in another. The professors pose the hypothetical of a
company being faced with a purchase offer. Depending on whether the
proposed acquisition is to be a simple merger or friendly or hostile tender
offer, a number of definitions have been proposed as to what would constitute a
fair price for the business. Fair price may be the value of the company
continuing to operate independently, the value as reflected by the price to be
received if the business is sold in competitive auction to the highest bidder, or
even the "value that bilateral, arm's-length bargaining would yield." 20 And,
depending on the type of transaction contemplated-whether friendly or
hostile-a crowded field or only one interested acquirer, a company "going
17 See Giuffra, supra note 12, at 119, 120. Professor Fischel, commenting on the Van
Gorkom ruling shortly after its announcement, wryly commented that the "outside
consultants are the biggest winners after [Van Gorkom]. The decision requires their
participation as a type of insurance no matter how worthless their opinion is or how much it
will cost." Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985).
18 See Richard B. Schmitt, Ifan Investment Bank Says the Deal is Fair, it May or May
Not Be, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1988, at 1, 11. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying
text for a discussion of various valuation techniques and their deficiencies.
19 Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 30.
20 Id. at31.
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private" or auctioned to an outside interest, any one of these definitions may be
arguably appropriate. In fact, a reasoned argument may be made for an
application of any of the three separately or in combination. Unfortunately,
depending on the definition used, the price deemed "fair" may vary
significantly.21 Investment banks are certainly aware of this confusion and are
given wide latitude in their choice of definition. 22 Indeed, in the opinions
themselves, the bankers frequently offer little clue as to what definition has
been used to arrive at their conclusions; they simply speak only to the adequacy
or inadequacy of price.23
This definitional confusion is not limited to the board and bank's valuation
process but is a problem courts themselves have struggled with in valuing
companies. There is no agreement as to how a company is valued in the
context of a minority exercising its statutory appraisal rights. In Piemonte v.
New Boston Garden Corp.,24 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
approved a valuation of the Boston Garden Arena Corporation which was a
weighted averaging of several separate methods of valuing a corporation:
market value, earnings value, and net asset value. The Delaware Supreme
Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,25 however, rejected a strict weighted
averaging of value factors including assets, market price, and earnings, in favor
of a "more liberal, less rigid and stylized approach."'26 The court recognized
the "proof of value by any technique or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community." 27 Neither decision provides
a clear definition of value. No precise formula for determining relative
weighing values is articulated by the Massachusetts court, and in the case of
Delaware, there exists a multitude of techniques acceptable within the financial
community for ascertaining values-all of which may yield radically different
results.
Even if one universal definition of fairness may somehow be formulated
and uniformly applied to valuation inquiries, the problem of inconsistent
valuation still remains. There is no consistently accepted process for valuation
and, consequently, the investment banking industry has no established uniform
21 Chazen, supra note 9, at 1443-50.
22 Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 34; see also Schmitt, supra note 18, at 1
("[Flairness can be subjective .... The approach can be massaged so it supports the
desired result.").
23 See supra note 10 for a typical fairness opinion.
24 387 N.E.2d 1145 (Mass. 1979).
25 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See infra note 137 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court's ruling in Weinberger.
26 457 A.2d at 704.
27 Id. at 713.
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procedure for valuing a company in the context of a fairness opinion. 28 There
are a number of procedures available to measure the value of an individual
corporation each, unfortunately, yielding differing results. 29 While the methods
of valuing companies are as varied as the companies themselves, certain
general classifications may be made. Specifically, four differing forms of
valuation analysis are most commonly utilized.
The four methods include: discounted cash flow analysis, evaluation of
comparable companies, evaluation of comparable acquisitions, and liquidation
value.30 Although there are arguable merits to each method, it has been
suggested that any proper valuation analysis should utilize a combination of
some or all of these approaches, as "no single method of evaluating companies
is entirely correct or truly comprehensive." 3'
The first, and widely perceived as the most prevalent, of the valuation
methods is discounted cash flow analysis ("DCF"). DCF analysis generally
involves the calculation of the net present value of the cash flows generated by
28 See, e.g., Giuffra, supra note 12, at 137. Providing an illustrative contrast are the
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) that establish definitive measures governing accountants' rendition of audits and
other services. The rules provided by GAAS and GAAP set out normative standards against
which the competence and reliance of accountants' efforts and output may be judged.
Investment bankers, however, are not constrained by any established industry norms
governing the rendition of fairness opinions in corporate control contexts.
29 See, e.g., In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, No. CIV.A.9001, 1991 WL
244213 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1991) (plaintiff's discounted cash flow and comparable company
analysis suggested fair value of stock at $2,300 per share, while defendant's Delaware block
approach yielded a figure of $457 per share).
30 See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 9, at 97-123 (including book value and break-up
analysis, as well as numerous qualitative evaluators); Giuffra, supra note 12, at 137-39
(summarizing the four methods); Michael W. Martin, Note, Fairness Opinions and
Negligent Misrepresentation: Defining Investment Bankers' Duty to 7Tird-Party
Shareholders, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 133, 139-41 (1990) (listing break-up analysis as a
fifth method); Arthur H. Rosenbloom & Arthur H. Aufses 111, On Understanding Investment
Banker Liability, 4 INSIGHTS, Apr. 1990, at 3, 4; Brian H. Saffer, Touching All Bases in
Setting Merger Prices, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1984, at 42 (concisely analyzing
the strengths and weaknesses of the four techniques).
31 Saffer, supra note 30, at 42. As Professor Kuhn has noted:
Experience proves that no single method of valuing acquisition targets is always proper
or truly comprehensive. The M&A process occurs in the real world when multiple
forces interact on so many levels as to almost defy analysis; M&A is not sheltered by
the highly stylized, well-controlled, idealized models of academics and computer
programmers.
KUHN, supra note 9, at 98.
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the operation of a business entity. 32 The operational rationale behind the
utilization of this method of valuation is that "anything is worth what it can
earn.'33 Basically, in determining how much a company is worth by using this
approach, an analyst will first make projections for a five to ten year period of
the earnings and cash flow of the particular business. The analyst will then
determine the business's value at the end of the projection period, followed by
a determination of the risk characteristics of the business and proper discount
rate to be applied to the valuation. Finally, the process concludes with the
actual computation of DCF values.34
Unfortunately, it is the very essence of this process that constitutes the
deficiencies evident in a DCF analysis. Primary among the shortcomings of this
approach is the necessity for numerous and highly subjective forecasts and
projections that must be made by the analyst.3 5 These include predictions
regarding future discount and tax rates, industry and market vitality, future
interest and inflation rates, and assumptions about the company's unrealized
future prospects. 36 A slight adjustment to any of these core projections by the
32 Net present value (NPV) essentially equates the difference between expected outlays
and the discounted present value of a target's anticipated cash flows. See KUHN, supra note
9, at 100. For a discussion of NPV principles, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 12-24 (net present value foundations), 29-
33 (net present value calculation) (3d ed. 1988).
33 Saffer, supra note 30, at 42. Indeed, the future-oriented outlook and intrinsic focus
on an entity's earning power furnished by DCF analysis is a principal advantage of this
valuation method over older techniques that concentrate instead on historical based
information, such as past earnings and market values. See generally Edward E. Shea,
Modem Business Valuation Methods, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 67, 69-71.
34 Giuffra, supra note 12, at 137-38 n.104. See generally Shea, supra note 33, at 76-
79 (illustrating DCF mechanics). For a concise analytical study of DCF analysis as applied
to the valuation businesses, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 32, at 62-66.
35 "DCF can be precise (i.e., replicable) without being accurate (i.e., not conforming
to reality)." KUHN, supra note 9, at 101. The mutable nature of DCF inputs is not
considered problematic in the context of everyday business transactions, such as capital
budgeting decisions, because the analyst making the necessary assumptions is interested in
obtaining an accurate figure and will utilize only factors of the highest quality. Outside of
the ordinary business setting, however, the existence of any such inherent impetus for
probity on the part of the analyst is questionable. See CEDE & Co. and Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *8 n.17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990)
(noting inherent veracity of DCF inputs in ordinary corporate decisions as compared to
differing motivations underlying projections generated for litigation).
36 Bebehuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 35; Martin, supra note 30, at 139-40. The
weaknesses inherent in utilization of DCF analysis are discussed in Robert H. Haynes &
David A. Garvin, Managing as if Tononow Mattered, 60 HARV. Bus. REv., May-June
1982, at 70, 73-74.
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analyst may substantially alter the ultimate valuation.37 Another problem with
DCF analysis is that it may ignore other external economic forces that the
market may be using to evaluate a particular investment, such as the
idiosyncratic appeal of the entity to certain investment groups including
corporate raiders or synergy-seeking business entities.38
Another valuation method used by financial analysts involves comparing
the business to be valued with companies possessing similar financial and
operational profiles. 39 The evaluator will examine the financial ratios of
comparable businesses to obtain a range of reasonableness within which to
bound the proposed value of a given entity. This method is based upon the
theory that companies that look and operate alike are likely to be similar in
value. The difficulty in propitiously using this technique, however, is finding a
company or companies that effectively compare with the enterprise to be
valued. Inevitably, some manipulation of the comparison business may be
necessary to effectuate the analysis. This process, quite obviously, suffers from
the same problems of subjectivity and uncertainty that accompany the DCF
valuation procedure discussed earlier.
Another commonly used valuation technique is the comparable acquisitions
method of analysis. Similar in rationale to the comparable companies valuation
method, this technique focuses on measuring value through an examination of
current acquisitions market forces. The assumption underlying this approach is
that the acquisitions market is a "true reflection of the market interaction of
willing buyers and willing sellers" 40 and will thus provide valuable insight into
the evaluated company's actual value. Unfortunately, the valuation judgments
made by the market in other acquisitions are not always helpful in establishing
the actual value of the business to be evaluated. The market will sometimes
reflect "aberrations" involving an unusually low valuation caused by a
comparable entity's distress sale, or "faddish buyer interests" bidding up a
37 See, e.g., CEDE & Co. and Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, No. CIV.A.7129, 1990
WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) ("Two experts looking at the same historic data
and each employing a discount[ed] cash flow valuation technique arrive at best estimates as
different as $13.14 per share and $62.75 per share."); In re Radiology Associates, Inc.
Litigation, No. CIV.A.9001, 1991 WL 244213, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1991) ("The
quality of the projection as to the future benefits over some period and the residual or
terminal value is central to the reliability of the underlying methodology of the discount[ed]
cash flow method.").
38 See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145 (Mass. 1979);
Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass. 1986) (non-
financial intangibles including new television and player contracts, as well as prevailing
record and overall prospects of franchise, considered in determining net asset value).
39 See, e.g., In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, No. CIV.A.9001, 1991 WL
244213, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1991) (reaffirming the general validity of the comparable
company method).
40 Saffer, supra note 30, at 43.
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comparable company's price.41 Also, it is difficult to find truly comparable
acquisitions. Few industries generate the sufficient number of transactions
required to provide a representational cross-section relatively free of the
influence of "aberrational" forces.
Still another widely used valuation technique, liquidation analysis, entails
determining what a concern's assets can be sold for in an orderly manner, the
resulting surplus or shortfall, above or below liabilities comprising value.42
The apparent strength of this method is its reliance upon existing, quantifiable
assets and liabilities. Its most striking flaw, however, is its inability to build
into its valuation estimate the effect on value that the future earnings potential
of a company and the management talent available to the operation may have.43
Although the above discussed four valuation methods are commonly used,
they are broadly classified and are by no means exclusive. A dizzying array of
differing approaches to valuation involving combinations, in no particular
uniform manner, of net asset value, past earnings multiplies, dividend
payments, and share price are commonplace. 44  In any event, most
commentators agree that any valuation study should utilize several of the
valuation methods discussed above or perhaps even a weighted average of the
most common four.45
As there has yet to emerge any consensus on the best method of valuing a
business and the only consensus to result is that a blend of approaches may be
best, the investment banker may use any of these methods without fear of
violating recognized industry norms. Considering the vast numbers of
combinations possible and the fact that each approach may yield "different
ranges of values" 46 a bank is confronted with the prospect of opining to the
fairness of any number of values based on its valuation process. This fact
suggests that a bank has the ability to be "offered" a conclusion as to value by
a board seeking a finding of being properly informed, and, by using the right
combination of valuation methods, may then create a process to justify the
41 Id. "[The M&A market often evinces aberrations-companies selling too low when
suffering distressed conditions... and companies selling too high when faddish or foolish
buyers are over-eager to acquire." KUHN, supra note 9, at 104.
42 Saffer, supra note 30, at 43; KUHN, supra note 9, at 106-107.
43 Saffer, supra note 30, at 43.
44 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 34-35 (listing assorted valuation
approaches).
45 See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 9, at 98-99 ("It is a fundamental error not to employ
multiple methods to assess valuation and price."); Giuffra, supra note 12, at 138-39
(proposing liability for investment banks' failure to utilize all four of the discussed
methods).
46 Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 30, at 3. "[IThe range of fairness is too great to
expect opinions to be a very good indicator of what a fair deal for shareholders might be."
Longstreth, supra note 13, at 19.
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preferred conclusion. A number of commentators have criticized this ability,
suggesting that it creates the prospect of "fairness for hire."47 Indeed as one
observer has commented, "the approach can be massaged so it supports the
desired result." 48
Theoretically, because the banks are independent entities with a strong
motivation to maintain a reputational integrity that is bolstered by a perceived
independence from their clients, this potential for abuse does not have to be
realized. Structural factors, however, inherent in the way the investment
banking industry functions, counterbalance any protection reputational concerns
may provide. Conflicts of interest abound to threaten a bank's independence
from its clients.
Investment banks are, above all, entities formed to create profits for their
investors. They are not governmental or philanthropic entities established for
promoting the common welfare. Their sole motivation is economic. Either they
produce monetary profits or they cease to function. The greater the profit
produced, the better for their owners. Like any other profit-minded enterprise,
the more the banks "sell," the greater their return (and the happier the owners).
It is this fundamental fact of their existence that creates the conflicts of interest
that prevent any real independence from their clients and any truly objective
analysis and evaluation of the "fairness" of their clients' transactions.
47 Robert McGough, Fairness for Hire, FORBES, July 29, 1985, at 52; see also Dale
A. Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating
Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 250 (1988); Giuffra, supra note 12, at 123.
48 Schmitt, supra note 18, at 1.
Fairness opinions also are something a client can hide behind. When Amsted Industries
Inc. officials were seeking support for a proposed 1986 leveraged buy-out, they trotted
out a Salomon Brothers fairness opinion in proxy materials. What shareholders didn't
see, however, was a Goldman Sachs estimate putting the value of the company as much
as $100 million more than the management offer.
Id. "Investment bankers do on occasion decline to render fairness opinions satisfactory to
management. But this is more the exception than the rule." Longstreth, supra note 13, at
19. See also Clinton A. Stuntebeck & Wayne M. Withrow, Fairness Opinions Slould Offer
More Detailed Financial Analyses, NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1988, at 22-23.
When a corporation's management takes a company private through a management
buyout (MBO), the buyout group will engage investment bankers to opine as to the fairness
of the price it is offering to the corporation's shareholders as a matter of course.
Commentators have taken a dim view of such actions, especially when the resulting private
company's value is far in excess of the price paid. "There have been several MBOs where
the value gap between what management paid and what they shortly realized was
shocking .... A 'fairness opinion' that underestimates realized value by 80 percent is
perhaps the newest candidate for the quintessential oxymoron." ROBERT A.G. MONKs &
NELL MINow, PoWER AND ACCOUNTABarrY 115 (1991).
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Furthermore, two major structural problems, which are by-products of the
banks profit-making motivation and competitive forces within the industry, act
to preclude objectivity. The first is the fee structure by which the banks are
compensated for their services, and the second is the need for developing a
large and active client base to produce necessary revenue and profits.
Corporate control transactions are especially lucrative fee generation
opportunities for investment banks. These transactions frequently involve a
multitude of tasks that a bank may be asked to participate in and, obviously,
profit from. In addition to rendering the fairness opinion for which the
investment bank will generally receive a fixed fee,49 the bank often is
responsible for advising on both general and specific financial strategy and
arranging the necessary financing to effect the transaction. This is where the
large profits are to be made. As the transactions have grown in size and
complexity, the development and- marketing of more creative and specialized
financial instruments have been necessitated to fund these activities. The
bankers have developed a virtual cornucopia of innovative types of securities to
meet the challenge. 50 As a consequence, underwriting and advisory fees for
arranging the financing have become staggering-often fixed at some
percentage of the total "value" of the transaction. 51 The larger the size of the
49 Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 38.
50 As examples of the new types of instruments the banks created in the 1980s, some
of which were used to finance these transactions, are the following: Preferred Equity
Redemption Cumulative Stock (PERCS); Variable Rate Preferred Stock; High Yield Bonds
("Junk Bonds"); Spread-Adjusted Notes (SPANs); Asset-Backed Securities; Medium Term
Notes. Miriam Bensman, The 1980s, The Decade That Transfonned Corporate Finance,
INv. DEALERS DIG., Jan. 8, 1990, at 16; Michael Liebowitz, New Credit-Adjusting Debt
Keeps Interest-Rate Risk; Merill Product Doesn't Wait for Rating Agendes, INV. DEALERS
DIG., Mar. 12, 1990, at 26; Tom Pratt, How Percs Became the Year's Hottest Product; The
Inside Story of Morgan Stanley's Three-Year Wait to Revive a Hybrid, INV. DEALERS DIG.,
Dec. 2, 1991, at 20.
51 The RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout, an approximately $25 billion transaction, was
particularly lucrative for the investment bankers. Dillon Read and Lazard Freres rendered a
fairness opinion and were the financial advisors in the transaction. Each bank received an
initial $1.5 million advisory fee, an additional $3.5 million for the fairness opinion, and a
further $9 million upon completion of the tender offer. The $14 million that each bank
made, however, pales in comparison to the $400 million in fees that Wasserstein Perella,
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Drexel Burnham Lambert split for financing the LBO.
Alison L. Cowan, Investment Bankers'Lofty Fees, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1988, § 1, at 41;
RiR Nabisco Inc., Proxy Statement, supra note 10 at 11, 42. For an interesting account of
the RJR LBO, see BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE
(1990). Some other transactions:
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deal, the greater the fees. A ten million dollar fee is not at all uncommon.
Additionally, future noncontractual profits are ensured as the instruments
created have become more complex; once issued, the bank may provide the
only effective trading market for them, and, as the "market maker," stands
ready to earn substantial brokerage fees. A rather notorious example of this
phenomenon involved Goldman, Sachs & Co., one of Wall Street's most
DEAL VALt (000) ADVISORS FEES (000)
Time, Inc./Warner
Comm. Merger (1989)
Matsushita/MCA
Merger (1990)
GA Pacific/N.
Nekoosa Merger
(1990)
AT&T/NCR Merger
(1991)
GTE/Contel Merger
(1991)
C&S/Sovran/NCNB
(1991)
$14,000,000 Wasserstein
Lehman Bros.
Merrill Lynch
Lazard Freres
$6,273,600 Allen & Co.
Nomura
Wasserstein
Lazard Freres
$ 3,640,564 Wasserstein
Goldman, Sachs
$7,377,596 Morgan Stanley
Dillon Read
Goldman, Sachs
$6,728,719 Merrill Lynch
Paine Webber
Goldman Sachs
Salomon Bros.
$4,661,630 Morgan Stanley
Wolfensohn
Merrill Lynch
Salomon Bros.
First Boston
Lehman Bros.
Dillon Read
Anne B. Fisher & Kathleen C. Smyth, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Jan. 27, 1992, at
104; Jaclyn Fierman & Kathleen C. Smyth, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Ian. 28, 1991 at
90, 91; ime Warner Repons Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1989, at D5; C&S/Sovran Proxy
Statement, Oct. 1, 1991, at 27, 31, available in LEXIS, Company library, Proxy file;
Time, Inc., Proxy Statement, May 22, 1989, at 35-36, available in LEXIS, Company
library, Proxy file.
$10,000
42,000
32,000
16,000
$8,000
N.A.
N.A.
16,750
$15,250
17,400
$13,280
17,866
17,866
$6,000
6,000
5,000
5,000
$11,000
7,000
2,000
2,000
14,000
3,850
2,000
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respected banking houses. Goldman in the late 1980s participated in financing a
number of leveraged buyouts. As some of the highly leveraged enterprises
created by their efforts began to falter and the market for the "high yield"
instruments used to finance these companies became chaotic, Goldman created
an entity to participate in speculative arbitrage activities involving these bonds.
(Shortly thereafter, confronted with significant adverse publicity and client
resentment with this action, Goldman announced plans to terminate its "Water
Street Fund"). 52 In one instance, as a participant in the 1989 leveraged buyout
of the Florida Steel Corporation, Goldman was responsible for arranging the
sale of $110,000,000 of high yield securities to finance the transaction. It
earned a significant fee for this activity. Two years later, Goldman was once
again earning money dealing in these bonds, remarketing the instruments,
which had become depressed in value, to new investors.53
As the fees to be paid to the banks are frequently negotiated to be
contingent on the success of the transaction, and fees on subsequent "market
making" activities, although noncontractual, are certainly no less contingent
and dependent on the transaction's completion than the negotiated fee, there is a
significant economic incentive on the bank to "make the deal happen." Even if
a bank is paid for its fairness opinion regardless of the transaction's ultimate
outcome, a successful transaction means substantial revenues, both contractual
and noncontractual, and an aborted transaction leaves little to show for the
effort. There is thus tremendous pressure on the bank called upon to opine as
to the fairness of a proposed transaction, to deliver the opinion management
desires that will best facilitate the deal's completion.
A second industry-wide structural problem which impedes a banker's
ability to remain objective in rendering a fairness opinion involves the bank's
need to build and maintain an active client base. Like any other business,
unless a bank can continue to attract and retain a stable customer pool, it will
cease to profit or even function. The profit-producing potential of a corporate
control transaction not only involves the transaction itself, but the future
financing activities the surviving enterprise may produce.
It does not take a substantial leap of faith to realize that if a bank delivers a
fairness opinion that is contrary to the wishes of management, future dealings
with the corporation may be imperiled. Like any other professional rendering
52 Floyd Norris, Goldman Phasing Out Big Junk Bond Fund, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1991, at Dl. Despite these plans, Goldman recently gained a dominant stake in the nation's
two largest wallboard manufacturers by investing 21% of the fund's $1.15 billion value into
the depressed bonds of the two companies. The depressed bond prices are the result of the
companies' taking on too much debt in leveraged deals in which Goldman was the advisor.
Randall Smith, Goldman's in the Construction Business?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1992, at
Cl.
53 Florida Steel Agrees to Leveraged Buyout Transaction, PR NEwsWmRE, July 26,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Business file.
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advisory services, a banker is hired or fired by incumbent management. An
action that is perceived as hostile to management, such as refusing to opine as
to the fairness of a price management supports, will obviously not endear the
bank to management and could thus dim future employment prospects. A
banker who develops a reputation for being uncooperative is unlikely to be
eagerly retained by either past clients or other managers who learn of the
reputation. Cooperation breeds contentment and future employment. This fact,
obviously not unknown to the banks, places significant pressure on them to at
least consider acquiescence to the wishes of their customers.
Additionally, personal considerations inherent in the banker/manager
relationship militate against objectivity. Despite the fact that, legally, the bank
is employed by and is expected to advance the best interests of the corporation,
bankers must work with managers. As most banking relationships become
long-standing, personal relationships between the banker and manager develop
that naturally impact on the advice rendered. It would be casting too pristine a
light on fundamental human nature to assume that such personal friendships
that develop over time between managers and bankers would be completely
ignored when the bankers were asked to undertake an "independent" analysis.
As in all human contact, personality and friendship play an inevitable and
fundamental role.54
Finally, a further "structural" factor affecting a banker's objective
judgment is the actual origination of the transactions to be opined on. In the
merger "mania" of the late 1980s, it was not at all uncommon that transactions
which were the subject of the fairness opinions in question were the very
creations of the opining banks. In order to boost revenues, banks, utilizing the
services of legions of analysts, developed numerous transactional scenarios
involving both present and hopefully future clients, which they then attempted
to "shop" to the various parties involved. 55 Once the deals were "sold" to
various managers and boards of directors, it would be folly to believe that
when asked to step back and deliver an opinion to the board or shareholders on
the transaction's fairness, a bank could remain totally objective. Imagine the
reputational impact on a bank who, after convincing management that the
purchase of another entity was a profitable business strategy, then refuses to
54 See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (prior
business relationships with board raises question of bank's impartiality), modified, 478 F.2d
1281 (2d Cir. 1973); see infra note 74 and accompanying text for discussion of Gerstle. See
also Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 42. In its proxy statement, a corporati6n usually
justifies hiring a particular investment bank to render a fairness opinion by reciting the
bank's past services to the corporation. See RJR Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 35-36.
55 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, SItwuld You Sue Your Investment Banker for Lousy
Advice? Bus. WK., Feb. 18, 1991, at 116; McGough, supra note 47, at 52; Benjamin J.
Stein, A New Coud Over Wall Street?; Investment Banking's Dirty Little Secret, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2.
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opine that the price management decided to pay, after consultation, of course,
with the proposing bank, was fair. True objectivity in this common
circumstance is difficult to achieve.
In summary, because of the varying methods of valuation considered
acceptable by the financial community, an evaluator of valuation is given a
wide range of latitude in establishing the value of a particular enterprise. Given
this fact and structural factors inherent to the investment banking business,
including the necessity of transaction-driven fee generation, the "partisan"
pressures placed on a bank asked to evaluate the "fairness" of a transaction are
such that truly objective and independent valuation advice is, as a practical
matter, difficult to achieve.
HI. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND INVESTMENT BANKERS
Despite the escalation in the sheer numbers of fairness opinions that the
investment banks have been asked to deliver and the corresponding increase in
fee volume occasioned by this growth, until very recently there has been no
corresponding increase in banker liability for inaccuracies contained within
these opinions. Traditionally, banker liability for misstatements or omissions to
the shareholders whose decisions were impacted by the faulty opinions was
highly restricted. Because the banks were commonly retained by the company's
board of directors, and the opinions rendered were thus addressed to the board,
the shareholders had no direct cause of action grounded in contract against the
banks because of a lack of privity. Actions grounded in tort were also
unavailable, under a similar privity doctrine that had been developed by the
courts in the early 1920s. The shareholder's only recourse lay under the federal
securities laws. Yet this avenue too was unattractive. A high culpability
standard traditionally required under these laws made any liability claim
difficult to prove and win.
Recently, however, based on the liberalization of traditional notions of
privity by several courts, the long-standing legal wall that had effectively
precluded bank liability for faulty opinions may be crumbling. In several recent
cases, the once discredited state law tort of negligent misrepresentation has
been revived and applied to form the basis for liability to shareholders by the
investment bankers for their inaccurately drawn opinions. Before examining
this "revolution" in legal thought, it is important to look first at why the
securities and contracts law have proven inhospitable to shareholder actions in
this area.
At first glance, because of the oft-stated goal of full and fair disclosure, it
would seem that the federal securities laws would provide fertile ground for an
attack on a faulty fairness opinion. The various anti-fraud provisions of these
laws provide numerous avenues for shareholder litigation, given the wide
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variety of corporate control transactions for which opinions are rendered.56
And, in fact, a number of actions have been brought in the anti-fraud area.57
Unfortunately, two stumbling blocks exist that restrict the ultimate success of
such actions; one, as the caselaw demonstrates, is surmountable, the other is
much more problematic. The first involves the actual content of the opinions
themselves. The anti-fraud provisions traditionally penalize misstatements or
omissions of material fact.58 As fairness opinions are generally expressions of
one's viewpoint as to financial adequacy, and not factual statements or
conclusions, it is thus questionable whether "errors" within them constitute the
56 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), is
a catch-all provision which prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security that violates rules prescribed by the SEC.
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992), under section 10(b).
This rule prohibits fraudulent acts and material misstatement and omissions in connection
with purchases and sales of securities. Section 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n,
regulates proxy solicitation. Section 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), provides that it is
unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of SEC rules. Rules 14a-3 through 14a-12, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a3-240.14a-12 (1992), are designed to ensure full and fair disclosure to
shareholders receiving proxy solicitations. Rule 14a-9 prohibits material misstatements,
omissions, and fraud in connection with the solicitation of proxies. Section 14(e) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988), prohibits material misstatements, omissions, and
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.
Section 13(e)(1) of the 1934 Act governs going private transactions. Section 13(e)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1988), prohibits an issuer of stock from purchasing its own stock
unless it complies with SEC rules promulgated to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative activities. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1992), defines going private
transactions subject to regulation and prohibits material misstatements, omissions, and
fraudulent acts in connection with such transactions. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), provides a private right of action for securities purchasers
when a registration statement contains an untrue statement or omission of material fact. See
infra note 58 for additional discussion of the anti-fraud provisions.
57 See, e.g., Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 720, 725
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
58 The antifraud provisions prohibit the making of "any untrue statement of a material
fact... necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading. .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (Section 14(e)
of the Williams Act, tender offers); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1992) (Rule lob-5, catch-all
antifraud provision); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b)(ii) (1992) (Rule 13e-3, going private
transactions); 17 C.F.R. § 14a-9(a) (1992) (Rule 14a-9, proxy statements). A fact is material
whenever there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (construing Rule 14a-9); accord Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988)
(applying TSC Industnies rule of materiality to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions); see
also THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECUrrms REGULATION, §§ 11.4 & 13.5
(Practitioner's ed. 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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factual misstatements the anti-fraud provisions address. But, as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in Herskovitz v.
Nutri/System, Inc.,5 9 "opinions" are actionable under the anti-fraud provisions.
There the court stated that a banker's "opinion or projection, like any other
representation, will be deemed untrue for purposes of the federal securities
laws if it is issued without reasonable genuine belief or if it has no basis." 60
The case involved the issuance of a fairness opinion in the context of a
leveraged buyout.61 In its opinion asserting the fairness of a particular price
being offered the shareholders, the defendant bank based its conclusions on the
assumption of a specific corporate tax rate. Yet, in the proxy statement
containing the bank's opinion, there was disclosure that tax reform measures
were pending that could significantly reduce the tax rate then in effect. The
court ruled that despite this disclosure, the "separate issue of possible
fraudulence in the fairness opinion itself"62 must still be considered. Because
the fairness opinion had "independent significance to shareholders," 63 if the
59 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054, and cert. denied sub
nom. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Herskovitz, 489 U.S. 1060 (1989).
60 Id. at 184 (citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 867
(9th Cir. 1977); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489-
90 (9th Cir. 1974); S.E.C. v. Okin, 137 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1943). Recovery can be
had when factfinder concludes that the expert adopts an objectively unreasonable
assumption. Herskovitz, 857 F.2d at 185.
61 Nutri/System shareholders challenged senior management's leveraged buyout of the
corporation on the grounds that shareholder approval of the LBO was procured through the
use of a materially false and misleading proxy statement in violation of sections 10(b) and
14(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78n(a). The shareholders also alleged that
Nutri/System directors and officers violated their fiduciary duties to the shareholders in
violation of Pennsylvania law by approving the LBO at an unfair price. Herskovitz, 857
F.2d at 182.
62 Id. at 184. The Connecticut National Bank used a discounted cash flow analysis to
appraise the value of Nutri/System. For purposes of this analysis, the bank assumed that
Nutri/System would be taxed at a corporate tax rate of 46% for the next five years after the
LBO. Based on this assumption, the bank issued a fairness opinion stating that $7.16 a share
price to shareholders for the L130 was fair. Nutri/System shareholders sued, alleging that
$7.16 a share was too low because it was generally recognized in the field of financial
analysis that Congress would soon reduce the corporate tax rate to between 33 and 36%. If
the bank had used these percentages in its analysis, it would have come up with a range of
prices between $7.58 and $10.35 a share. The district court issued a directed verdict in
favor of the bank because the company's proxy statement included disclosure of the pending
legislation. Id. at 183-84.
63 Id.
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bank based its opinion on assumptions that were "objectively unreasonable," 64
then that opinion was actionable.
The second and primary problem with bringing an action under the anti-
fraud provisions involves the culpability standards that are required. The
difficulty shareholders face in meeting these standards is the main reason why
the federal securities laws are not hospitable territory for actions on fairness
opinions. Generally, the anti-fraud provisions provide that the moving party
must prove that the defendant acted with some degree of scienter. Rule lOb-5 65
under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,66 the most popularly
used section for private anti-fraud actions, requires the demonstration that the
defendant acted with scienter, which the Supreme Court has defined as "intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 67 Although some lower courts have held
that "reckless" conduct may be sufficient to impose liability under this
section, 68 regardless of whether scienter or recklessness is called for, this
culpability standard is obviously not easy to meet. Consequently, it is a rare
occurrence that a shareholder is able to show that an investment banker acted
with the "evil" intent or reckless abandon in rendering a fairness opinion
necessary for liability. 69 Such an action is doomed to failure.
64 Id. at 185.
65 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
66 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
67 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
68 See, e.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985)
(severe recklessness standard); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir.
1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (severe recklessness); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978) (extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977) (extreme departure from the standards of reasonable care); cf. Stem v. American
Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 827 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (plaintiff must allege that
defendants knew or should have known of facts and circumstances concerning the fraud);
see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Wat Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show
Necessary Element of Scienter in vil Action for Damages Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.S. § 78j (b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 49 A.L.R. FED. 392 (1980 & Supp. 1991).
69 See, e.g., Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F. Supp. 578, 586, 590 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
(banks' motion for summary judgment granted because of lack of evidence that banks had
knowledge of fraudulent purchase of stock); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543,
1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Drexel also cannot be sued as an aider and abettor, because
plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite scienter.") rev'd in part on other grounds, 927
F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990); Baranski v. Serhant, 603 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (allegation
that bank knew or should have known of material facts showing existence of fraud
insufficient to allege scienter); see also Giuffra, supra note 12 at 129 n.66; Don J.
McDermett, Jr., Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule l0b-5: 77ze
Recklessness Standard in ivil Damage Actions, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1984).
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Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act which regulates proxy
solicitations and tender offers contains its own set of anti-fraud provisions.70
The proxy regulations forbid the use of any untrue or misleading statements in
connection with a solicitation. 71 The courts, however, have divided on the
culpability requirement for this area. While the Sixth Circuit in Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. 72 called for proof of scienter in a Section 14(a)
action against an outside accountant for an inaccurate financial statement
attached to a proxy statement, the Third Circuit in its recent Herskovitz
decision ruled that a bank may be held liable for a negligently rendered
misrepresentation contained within a fairness opinion.73 The Second Circuit has
taken a middle ground. Although stating that a negligence standard would
apply to the corporate issuers of a misleading proxy statement in Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.74 it left open the possibility of applying a stricter scienter
standard to outside advisors. Section 14(e), which regulates tender offers, has
been interpreted in various court rulings to require something more than
negligence for the imposition of liability. 75 Finally, although private rights of
action for false or misleading disclosure are allowed under Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 13e-3,76 which involves "going private"
transactions, it is unclear what culpability levels are required. 77
Despite the Third Circuit's recent "liberalization" of the culpability
requirement for an action under the proxy rules against a bank for a faulty
fairness opinion in Herskovitz,78 other courts have not rushed to follow its lead.
Given this fact and the firmly rooted scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5
actions, it does not appear likely that shareholders angered by a misformed
70 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
71 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9; see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
72 623 F.2d 422, 428-31 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
73 Herskovitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d at 179, 189, 190 (3d Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
74 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973).
75 See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
must allege facts implying knowledge or reckless disregard, mere negligence standard
cannot be used); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d
Cir. 1973) (knowing or reckless failure to discharge obligations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973); Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., 591 F. Supp. 942, 956 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(reckless disregard for the truth).
76 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3.
77 Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1474-76 (6th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); accord Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F.
Supp. 1105, 1116 (D.R.I. 1990); Kahn v. Lynden, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (W.D.
Wash. 1989).
78 Herskovitz v. Nurti/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra
notes 59-64 and accompanying text; see also Bart Fraust, Court Ruling May Open Area of
Liability for Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, Nov. 1, 1988, at 2.
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fairness opinion will find any solace through an action under the federal
securities laws.
Equally unavailing to frustrated shareholders has been the prospect of
seeking redress against a bank under simple contractual principles. Because the
bank has been hired by the board of directors and not the shareholders
themselves, the shareholders are not in contractual privity with the bank and
thus may not bring suit. Derivative actions are also ineffective. As Professor
Coffee has pointed out, such actions "are effectively neutralized by the demand
rule and the business judgment standard applied by many courts to a board
determination to reject demand or seek dismissal of the suit."79 Additionally,
derivative actions become procedurally overwhelming because of the significant
time and funding required.80
With securities and contract law basically unfriendly grounds for relief for
an improperly drawn fairness opinion, investors have recently turned to a
previously unlikely legal avenue for recovery-the law of torts and, more
specifically, the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Enjoying a steadily
expanding revitalization, this tort, once moribund, at least in its application to
third-party advisors, now provides a remedy for individuals able to demonstrate
reasonable and innocent reliance upon incorrect or misleading statements of
third-party professionals including accountants, engineers, and other
independent advisors, with whom they have no contractual privity but by
whom they are now owed a legally recognized duty of care. While initially this
action was used as the basis for assigning liability to accountants, lately other
professional advisors have been included in this tort's sweep. Most recently,
investment bankers have found themselves facing such actions for faulty
valuation opinions.
The roots of professional, specifically accountant's, liability to third parties
for misleading advice can be traced to the seminal case of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.81 In Ultramares, a firm of public accountants retained by Fred Stem &
Co., Inc. to conduct an annual audit and certify certain financial statements
79 John C. Coffee, Jr., New York's New Doctrine of 'Constructive Privity,' N.Y. LJ.,
Jan. 25, 1990, at 5, 6 n.3 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)); Auerbach
v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
80 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Plaintiff in derivative action must show: (1) plaintiff was
shareholder at time of injury, (2) action is not collusive, (3) plaintiff tried to obtain action
from board, (4) failure to obtain action, (5) plaintiff fairly and adequately represents
shareholders. In addition to procedural requirements, some states require plaintiffs to post a
bond to secure the defendants for their reasonable defense expenses should the defendants
prevail. WILLIAM M. FLRrcHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5971.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991); see also Donald Lund, Note,
Toward a Standard for Third-Party Advisor Liability in Mergers and Buy-Outs: Schneider
and Beyond, 52 U. P1Tr. L. REV. 603, 604 (1991).
81 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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negligently overvalued the company's assets. 82 A lender who advanced credit
to the company, asserting reliance upon the certified balance sheet presented by
Stem, sought recovery from the certifying accountants when Stem declared
bankruptcy shortly after borrowing substantial funds.83 Citing a lack of privity
between the parties, Justice Cardozo, speaking for the unanimous New York
court observed:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.84
In denying the lender's cause of action, it was necessary for Cardozo to
distinguish the New York court's earlier opinion in Glanzer v. Shepard.85 The
plaintiff in Glanzer was a buyer of beans who overpaid his seller in reliance
upon an erroneous certificate of weight issued by a public weigher.
Notwithstanding the fact that the seller, as opposed to the buyer, hired and paid
the public weigher, Cardozo stated that "assumption of the task of weighing
was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in terms of
contract or of privity." 86 Purporting to support this contention, the Glanzer
court noted its earlier decision in Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.s7 which
eliminated privity as a prerequisite to recovery of damages when a
manufacturer's negligence caused personal injuries to third parties.88 Finding
that the weigher's certificate had been issued for the "end and aim" of shaping
not the conduct of the payor but the performance of the plaintiffs, Cardozo
declined to dismiss the action on traditional privity grounds and utilized newly
expanding concepts of duty to provide a remedy. 89
82 Id. at 442-44. While the defendants certified the corporation's net worth as
$1,070,715.26, a careful and proficient audit would have revealed that the company was in
fact insolvent, as managers had boosted the balance sheet by falsifying accounts receivable
and other assets. Id.
83 Id. at 442-43. Although initially asserting an action grounded solely on negligence,
at trial the plaintiff added a claim for fraud. Id. at 443.
84 Id. at 444.
85 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
86 Id. at 276.
87 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
88 Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276.
89 Id. at 277. While professing that accountability expands with the knowledge of
output's anticipated use, Cardozo declared "[wle state the defendants' obligation.... in
terms, not of contract merely, but of duty." Id. at 276-77.
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In Ultramares it was clear that Cardozo felt that he had gone too far in
Glanzer, opening a virtual Pandora's box with the potential for indeterminate
liability for any and all third-party advisers. Attempting to limit Glanzer's
applicability, Cardozo described the services of the public weighers as being
primarily intended to inform third persons, while referring to the lender's
reliance on the accountant's certificate in Ultramares as only incidental or
collateral. 90 The feature that distinguished Ultramares, and thus precluded
liability, was the fact that the bond between the public weighers and the
plaintiffs in Glanzer "was so close as to approach that of privity, if not
completely one with it. Not so in the case at hand." 91 Summarizing his opinion
that was to remain the law on accountant liability in most jurisdictions for
nearly sixty years, Cardozo stated, "if there has been neither reckless
misstatement nor insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder,
the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the
contract .... "92 Thus, in the absence of "privity," there was to be no action
in tort by disgruntled individuals against third-party professionals for
negligently rendered advice.
In an attempt to explain the rationale underlying Ultramares' embrace of
"privity," several commentators have focused on the nature of the accounting
profession in the early 1930s. 93 Financial audits of that era were designed to
serve principally as methods of discovering and informing management of
employee theft and other financial irregularities. Consequently, businessmen of
90 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). In making this
determination, however, Cardozo appears to gloss over the fact that in ltrainares the
defendants supplied the Stem Company with thirty-two numbered copies of the certified
balance sheet to be exhibited by Stern in its usual course of securing credit and capital. Id.
at 442.
91 Id. at 446. The crucial distinction appears to be the fact that in Glanzer "the
transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among many, but
the 'end and aim of the transaction,' as certain and immediate and deliberately willed as if a
husband were to order a gown to be delivered to his wife ...." Id. at 445 (citations
omitted).
92 Id. at 448. Apparently attempting to clarify an accountant's duty of care, in the
opinion Cardozo stated that accountants owe their employers a contractual duty to render
certificates with care and skill, as well as a legal responsibility to execute them free from
fraud, while owing creditors and investors only the duty to avoid fraud. Id. at 444.
93 See, e.g., Michael A. Mess, Accountants and the Common Lav: Liability to Third
Parties, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 838, 838-40 (1977); Howard B. Wiener, Common Lav
Liability of the Cen'fied Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 233, 239-40, 250-53 (1983); Darrell D. Hallet & Thomas R. Collins, Comment,
Auditor's Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial
Statements, 44 WASH. L. REv. 139, 178-81 (1968); Judah Septimus, Note, Accountants'
Liability for Negligence-A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404-08 (1979).
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the era, aware of the primarily internal function of an accountant's audit, did
not reasonably expect that the auditor was acting to ensure third parties of his
client's economic health.94 However, as the nation's economy and capital
markets rapidly expanded and public ownership of corporate entities increased,
the function of the audit itself changed dramatically to serve not only the
demands of corporations but investors as well, providing independent
evaluations on the fairness of a company's accounting systems and the accuracy
of its financial statements. 95 Recognizing this change in approach and the
corresponding development of the large-scale accounting firm, many courts
have recently begun to liberalize the relational ties required in order to win a
negligence action against an accountant.
Fifty years after its Ultramares decision, the New York Court of Appeals
revisited the issue of accountant liability for negligent misrepresentation in
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.9 6 While reaffirming the
Ultramares requirement that a claimant must prove a relationship essentially
approaching privity to impose liability, the court sought to liberalize the
standard a degree. It established a three-step analysis for identifying those
persons in "near privity":
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual parties
who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports, certain prerequisites
must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the
furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3)
94 E.g., Wiener, supra note 93, at 250-51.
95 Id. See, e.g., First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1990)
(contemporary investors and lenders rely heavily upon audited financial statements);
Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (N.H. 1982)
(sophisticated accountants play central role in modem financial industry); H. Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983) ("The auditor's function has expanded from
that of a watchdog for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and
fairness of financial statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and
others.").
96 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). The Credit Alliance opinion decided two separate
cases, each of which involved appeals by accounting firms seeking dismissal of lower court
rulings that allowed negligence actions, brought by third parties, to proceed in the absence
of strict privity. In the first of these appeals, Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and dismissed the
negligence claim, essentially finding that the parties did not stand in a relation approaching
that of near privity. Id. at 119-20. In European American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs &
Kaye, however, the second case, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling, noting that the
defendants, having directly communicated with the plaintiff, were fully aware that the
purpose of their audit was actually to provide the third-party lender with data it required,
thereby demonstrating a relationship "approaching privity." Id. at 120.
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there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them
to that party or parties, which evinces the accountants' understanding of that
party or parties' reliance. 97
Although seemingly suggesting a narrow standard, the Credit Alliance decision
opened the door to successful litigation by objectively articulating the requisite
relationship that must be established in negligence actions brought against
accountants. 98
Although the New York court has liberalized its approach to the whole
third-party liability question, many other jurisdictions have chosen to go even
further. Today, it is generally acknowledged that an accountant's liability for
negligence to third parties may proceed, depending on the jurisdiction
involved, under three differing analytical approaches. These approaches,
ranging in degrees of liberality, are: (a) privity, (b) reasonable foreseeability,
and (c) actual foreseeability (as articulated in section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts).
A. Priiy
The traditional privity approach, as modified by the New York court in
Credit Alliance, remains the accepted method of analysis in several
jurisdictions. 99 A recent Indiana case illustrates its application. In Toro Co. v.
Krouse, Kern & Co.,100 the plaintiff argued that it had advanced substantial
amounts of credit to one Summit Power Equipment Distributors, Inc. in direct
reliance upon erroneous representations made by the Krouse accounting firm in
an audit it had conducted on Summit.10 1 Utilizing the three-step analysis posed
in Credit Alliance, the Toro court stated that the facts indicated the first two
prongs of the test had been met in that:
97 Id. at 118.
98 Accountants are not the only professionals who face liability under this standard.
The Court of Appeals of New York four years later held that an engineer, hired by a school
district's architect, was liable to the school district for negligently rendering advice as to the
structural soundness of a high school annex. Although the school district and engineer were
not in direct privity, because the engineer knew his report would affect the conduct of the
school district, the relationship between them was "so close as to approach that of privity."
Ossining School Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Ultramares,
174 N.E. at 446). See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989);
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Thayer v. Hicks,
793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180
(Neb. 1989).
100 644 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ind. 1986), atd, 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987).
101 Id. at 988.
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a reasonable inference can be made that Krouse knew that the reports it
furnished to Summit were to be used by Summit to induce [the plaintiff] Tor's
extension of credit and distributing rights based on Tor's reliance on the
information contained in the reports.
It is on the third prong of the test, however, that the complaint and
supporting evidence fails. [With the exception of a phone call from Tor's
credit manager to Krouse], there is no indication of conduct which can be
remotely construed as providing the necessary "near privity" link between
Krouse and Toro....
[The value of the phone call as evidence is minimal, especially] since...
Toro contacted Krouse. The third part of the Credit Alliance test requires
"conduct on thepart of the accountants linking them to [Toro."'0
Thus, although there was evidence indicating Krouse's awareness of the
audit statements' prospective use, liability to Toro for errors in these materials
did not adhere without some actual "linkage" to Toro by the accountants.
B. Reasonable Foreseeability
A second approach which is significantly more generous to prospective
plaintiffs is liability based on a third party's "reasonably foreseeable" reliance.
In this newest of accountant liability standards, courts apply traditional tort
duty concepts to accountants, holding them liable to any reasonably foreseeable
injured third party who relied upon their negligently drawn opinions. 103 The
New Jersey Supreme Court became one of the first courts to adopt this
rationale in its decision in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.104 In H. Rosenblwn,
the plaintiffs, when receiving stock in Giant stores in connection with the sale
of their business, apparently relied on an audit of Giant conducted by the
defendant accounting firm at Giant's behest. Giant stock later became worthless
after disclosure that its audited statements were false, and the plaintiffs sought
to recover for their now valueless holdings, asserting the auditing accountants'
negligence as the proximate cause of their losses.105 Denying defendants'
summary judgment motion, the court ruled that when an independent auditor
renders an opinion lacking any limitation as to whom the audited company may
10 2 Id. at 995 (quoting Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 118).
103 See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),
rev'd, No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, at *30 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992); International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, at *30
(Cal. Aug. 27, 1992); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315
(Miss. 1987); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
104 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
I51d. at 140.
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distribute its financial statements, the auditor owes a duty to all those it should
reasonably foresee as receiving the statements from the company and relying
thereon for "proper business purposes." 1°6 The H. Rosenblwn court held that
the "[d]efendants' ignorance of the precise use to which the statements would
be put does not eliminate their obligation .... [I]t is necessary only that Giant,
the entity for whom the audit was being made, used it for a proper business
purpose." 107
A pair of subsequent California cases expanded accountant liability by
finding for plaintiffs who could show that the independent auditor should have
reasonably foreseen their reliance. In International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Accountancy Corp.,108 the plaintiffs brought a negligence action against
accountants who prepared erroneous financial statements for a party from
whom the plaintiffs agreed to purchase and sell loans on the secondary
market. 1°9 Finding that independent public accountants owe ultimate allegiance
to the lending and investing public,110 the court held that certified public
accountants owe a duty of care to all reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs damaged
as a result of their reasonable reliance on unqualified audited financial
statements."' The California Court of Appeals reaffirmed this approach four
years later in its holding in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.112 The Bily court
upheld the rule of reasonable foreseeability established in International
Mortgage, and found in favor of the plaintiffs, purchasers of subsequently
worthless stock and warrants who sought relief based upon reliance on the
unqualified financial statements negligently prepared by the defendant-
accountants. 
113
106 Id. at 153. In discussing the prospect of accountants guarding against liability by
attaching disclaimers to their output, the court briefly noted the English decision in Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, H.L. 1963 2 All E.R. 575 (1963). H. Rosenblum, 461
A.2d at 152. The Hedey Byrne decision adopted a species of third-party liability premised
upon an injured party's foreseen reliance and is credited with precipitating a reexamination
of U/trmnares in the United States. See Mess, supra note 93, at 849-50.
107 461 A.2d at 155.
108 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), ovemded by Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, at *30 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992).
109 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
110 Id. at 224.
111 Id. at 227.
112 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698,
at *30 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992).
113 271 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 483. The plaintiffs in Bily either purchased blocks of
Osborne Computer Corporation stock from major shareholders or aided Osborne's quest for
bridge financing, pending an initial public offering, by executing irrevocable standby letters
of credit in favor of the bridge lender in exchange for warrants yielding favorable terms on
Osborne stock. All but one of the plaintiffs asserted direct reliance upon an unqualified audit
opinion authored by the defendants that failed to disclose profound weaknesses in Osborne's
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However, two years later, the California Supreme Court, stating that "an
auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound," 114 overruled the appellate court's
approach to auditor negligence liability. Suggesting that the lower court's
standard "raises the spectre of multibillion-dollar professional liability that is
out of proportion" to fault, the court rejected the reasonable forseeablility
approach in favor of the Restatement's more conservative actual forseeablility
standard. 115 It is important to note that the California court declined to adopt
the New York court's privity analysis which functions as the most stringent
standard.
C. Actual Foreseeability-Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
Functioning as an intermediate approach, residing midway between the
seemingly bipolar concepts of privity and reasonable foreseeability, is a method
of analysis suggested by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.116
Described by commentators as premising liability upon actual foreseeability, 117
this section states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance on the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
accounting procedures, resulting in financials that significantly overvalued the doomed
computer venture to the investors detriment. Id. at 472-73.
1 14 Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, at *18 (Cal. Aug.
27, 1992).1 15 Id. at *20.
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see, e.g., Selden v. Burnett,
754 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1988); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698
(Cal. Aug. 27, 1992); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson
& Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn.
1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); Raritan
River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Haddon View
Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tx. Ct. App. 1971); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford,
386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
117 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 30, at 156 (noting Restatement's focus on plaintiffs
whose reliance was "actually foreseen" by the defendant); Susan Getzendanner & Andrew
S. Morrison, Liability of Advisors to Nonclients, M&A AND CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP.,
Mar. 14, 1990 at 677 (this standard focuses upon accountant's knowledge that its output
would be distributed to an identified person or limited group of persons).
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(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to the loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction. 118
The earliest case to make use of the Restatement standard in defining
accountant liability to third parties was Rusch Factors, Inc. v. I.evin.119 In
Rusch, the plaintiff conditioned its extension of credit to a Rhode Island
corporation upon receipt of certified financial statements which the corporation
hired the defendant-accountants to prepare.120 Although the defendant certified
the corporation as solvent, the business subsequently went into receivership,
and the plaintiff sought recovery in a tort negligence action asserting reliance
on the defendants' representations.121 Noting with approval the rationale
outlined in section 552, the court held "that an accountant should be liable in
negligence for careless financial misrepresentations relied upon by actually
foreseen and limited classes of persons."' 22
Drawn by the appeal of moderately extending accountant liability, the
Florida Supreme Court recently adopted the section 552 standard in First
Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co. 123 The plaintiff in First Florida provided
a line of credit to C.M. Systems, Inc., after acquiring certified financial
statements and verbal assurances directly from the borrower's independent
auditor. When the financial statements and the underlying audit proved faulty,
the plaintiff brought suit against the independent accountants for recovery of its
lost funds. Discarding restrictive privity antecedents, the court held that section
552 "balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold accountants
to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world
with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds the
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
119 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
12 0 Id. at 86.
121 Id. at 87.
122 Id. at 93. The court declined to rule on the efficacy of extending an accountant's
liability to the bounds of actual foreseeability but instead left that issue to be developed
judicially. Id.
123 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990). For a detailed discussion of the First Florida decision
and third-party liability concept see Marc T. Milian, Note, An Accountant's Liability to
Thdrd Parties: A Continued Assault on the Citadel of Privity, 19 STErsON L. REV. 711
(1989).
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bounds of their real undertaking." 124 Ruling that an accountant may be liable to
"those persons or classes of persons" whom he actually "'knows' will rely on
his opinion," 125 the court concluded that First Florida's direct communication
with the defendants clearly met this standard and found in its favor. However,
the court expressly refused to extend its new standard beyond "actual
foreseeabiity" to classes of plaintiffs who an accountant "'should have
known'" would read his works, because "an accountant controls neither his
client's accounting records nor the distribution of his reports." 126
As the foregoing discussion detailed, liability actions against accountants
by third parties for negligent misrepresentation have experienced a virtual
renaissance in recent years following the liberalization of the strict privity
requirement originally established in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.127 Although
widespread, the decline of the privity standard has not been uniform, with most
jurisdictions proceeding along one of three progressively liberal paths: (1) the
124 558 So. 2d at 16 (quoting Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,
367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C. 1988)).
Because of the heavy reliance upon audited financial statements in the contemporary
financial world, we believe permitting recovery only from those in privity or near
privity is unduly restrictive. On the other hand, we are persuaded by the wisdom of the
rule which limits liability to those persons or classes of persons whom an accountant
"knows" will rely on his opinion rather than those he "should have known" would do
so ....
Id. at 15.
125 Id.
126 Id. Although the Florida Supreme Court elected to adopt a Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552 analysis when resolving the dispute in First Florida, it appears that the ruling
and underlying facts of the case fall squarely within the reach of the more restrictive
"approaching privity" standard outlined in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). Indeed, in First Florida the court expressly noted that
the accountants in question "personally delivered the financial statements to the bank with
the knowledge that it would rely upon them in considering whether or not to make the
loan." 558 So. 2d at 16. This circumstance, arguably, exhibits a bond between First Florida
Bank and the accountants "so close as to approach that of privity, if not completely one with
it." Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 117 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441, 446 (N.Y. 1931)). Thus, while the First Florida court couched its reasoning in terms
of the "actually foreseeable" standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, the factual
basis underlying the court's holding does not, in actuality, seem to stray far from a nexus
between the parties that "approaches privity." See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Credit Alliance's "approaching privity" standard of accountant
liability.
127 See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Independent
Accountant to Investors or Shareholders, 35 A.L.R.4TH 225 (1985); Jack W. Shaw, Jr.,
Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to 7hird Parties, 46 A.L.R.3D 979 (1972).
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New York court's "approaching privity" standard as outlined in Credit
Alliance;128 (2) actual foreseeability, as suggested by section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts; and (3) reasonable foreseeability.
As one might expect, liability to third parties for poorly rendered advice,
based on the tort of negligent misrepresentation, has not been limited to
accountants. 129 Also implicated as potential defendants are attorneys, 130
abstractors, 131 engineers, 132 architects, 133 and other professional advisors. 134
As the significant increase in merger activity in the mid 1980s led to
tremendous and unprecedented profits for members of the investment banking
community, it was inevitable that the investing public, concerned with present
and prospective abuses by the banks arising out of this activity, would call for
legal accountability and redress. 135 A number of legal commentators supported
128 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
129 Indeed, in Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), Cardozo advanced
such instances as a negligent surgeon's liability to a minor patient, even though a parent
paid the bill, and the duty owed by a bailee to care for goods bailed in the name of one
person, though the deposit was made by another, in maintaining that the assessment of
professional liability beyond the narrow bounds of privity was not a new legal concept. Id.
at 276 (citations omitted). Commenting on the state of professional liability it has been noted
that "[pirofessions once seemingly inviolate from litigation are no longer sacrosanct. The
age-old axiom that physicians bury their mistakes, while attorneys and accountants file
theirs away, has little relevance in modem-day America." Mess, supra note 93, at 838 n.1
(quoting Stuart E. Eizenstat & G. Wldliam Speer, Accountants' Professional Liability:
Expanding Exposure, 22 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. Summer 1972, 7).
130 See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (attorney that provided client written opinion intended to influence
certain nonclients found liable to the known third parties); see also Joan Teshima,
Annotation, Attorney's Liability to One Other than Immediate Client for Negligence in
Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.4TH 615 (1988). For an overview of various
theories of attorney liability relating to corporate transactions see Darrel A. Rice & Marc I.
Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transactions, 16 J. CoRP. L. 375, 391-402 (1991)
and Gail Sindell, It's Open Season on Securities Lawyers, MANHATrAN LAW., Dec. 1990,
at 16.
131 See, e.g., William B. Johnson, Annotation, Negligence in Preparing Abstract of
7tle as Ground of Liability to One Other than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 A.L.R.4TH
314 (1986); Thomas C. Roady, Jr., Professional Liability of Abstractors, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 783 (1959).
132 See, e.g., Ossining School Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989).
133 See, e.g., Bib Allen, Liabilities of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties, 22
ARK. L. REV. 454 (1968).
134 See, e.g., Mary Van Osdel Manning, Comment, Liability to Third Partes for
Economic Injury: Priviy as a Useful Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U. L.
REv. 87 (1981).
135 Investment bank revenues increased dramatically during the 1980s and the mass
media was highly critical of the banks' activities during that decade. Public disenchantment
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this move, suggesting that the imposition of liability would lead to better bank
behavior. 136 An existing and logically transferable approach was the freshly-
with members of the financial community focused on certain individuals such as Ivan
Boesky who, during an address to the 1985 graduating class of the University of California
at Berkley Business School, stated: "Greed is all right, by the way .... I want you to know
that. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself." David
Eisner, "King of the Arbs" Topples, Ci. TRI., Nov. 23, 1986, Business section, at 1. In
both popular fiction and nonfiction, the investment banking community was a favorite
target. "If you weren't making $250,000 a year within five years, then you were either
grossly stupid or grossly lazy .... By age thirty, $500,000 .... By age 40 you were
either making a million a year or you were timid and incompetent." TOM WOLFE, THE
BONFIRE OF THE VANmIES 60 (Bantam ed. 1988); "Here he was about to launch the largest
takeover battle of his career-indeed, in the history of Wall Street-and his advisors were
more worried about their compensation than their tactics." BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN
HALYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 220 (1990); "He calculated that the fees alone would
top the value of a $500 million buyout. ... 'It's like throwing a hundred pounds of bloody
meat into a shark pool,' he mused." Id. at 242-43.
136 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 46-52 (recommending close judicial
scrutiny of fairness opinions to curb bank abuses); Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment
Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (1992) (proposing that investment bankers
be liable to shareholders because of their role as gatekeepers for corporate control
transactions); Giuffra, supra note 12 at 135 (arguing for imposition of negligence liability;
also calls for industry-wide investment banking standards and stricter judicial scrutiny); Dale
A. Oestrle, Fairness Opinions as Magic Pieces of Paper, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1992)
(suggesting that fairness opinions be used as evidence of director misconduct); Oestrele &
Norberg, supra note 47, at 253 (argues for bank liability directly to the corporation as a
fiduciary); Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy
Reagan Defense:" May Target Boards "Just Say No?" Should They Be Allowed To?, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 472 (1990); Donald Lund, supra note 80, at 627; Sherry R. Sontag,
Eight Panels Set Hearings on Mergers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 1, 29 (reporting on
SEC proposals to make investment bankers legally liable for their opinions); Martin, supra
note 30, at 133 (arguing for clearer judicial guidelines in negligent misrepresentation actions
against investment bankers for faulty fairness opinions); Michael Schuldt, Comment, A
Statutory Proposal for the Regulation of Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control
Transactions, 56 Mo. L. REV. 103 (1991) (proposing statutory scheme to regulate
investment banks). But see, e.g., William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They
and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523 (1992) (observing that
fairness opinions assure the continued application of the business judgement rule by
sheltering boards of directors from liability and arguing that courts should only find
investment banks liable for such opinions in instances of fraud).
Professor Carney's approach to the fairness opinion debate is engaging but does not, I
believe, go far enough. He describes the fairness opinion as serving "corporations and their
stockholders" by "assuring the continued application of the business judgement rule during
an era when it has been under severe attack." Id. at 525. While I have no qualms with
zealously continuing to protect board decisiomaking through a disciplined application of
the business judgment rule, the formalistic "requirement" of the procurement of a fairness
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evolved third-party liability standard applicable to accountants. If accountants
could be held liable to third parties for negligent misrepresentation, why not
investment bankers, who served in a similar financial advisory capacity and
whose opinions were relied on by similar third parties? The theory of holding a
banker liable for an inaccurate fairness opinion under the tort of negligent
misrepresentation had thus been born. It would now be up to the courts to give
the theory legitimacy.
In late 1987, in what was the first judicial application of newly liberalized
negligent misrepresentation principles to financial advisors, 137 a New York
court ruled that, in certain instances, shareholders may assert a cause of action
in negligence against investment bankers hired by their board of directors. This
opinion prior to the application of the rule is not consistent with the purpose behind the
business judgment rule, which is to protect the informed deliberations of the board. In fact,
the fairness opinion requirement creates a disincentive on the part of the directors to
adequately inform themselves. Thoughtful deliberation should be the board's best
protection, not the mechanistic employment of some beholden "expert." This is sheer
formalism with high cost, and, as I argue in this Article, little corresponding benefit.
I am also troubled somewhat by Professor Carney's discussion of what constitutes a
fair price. Id. at 533-35. While I agree with his conclusion that price "fairness" is an
elusive concept, I am concerned with any attempt to introduce notions of fairness into the
bargaining process at all. In a properly functioning market, a transaction is neither fair nor
unfair, only acceptable to the transacting parties. What is of real importance is adequate
disclosure. Any focus on fairness, or the lack thereof, misses the point. The problem is not
that it is "difficult" to determine fairness, it is that the entire concept of "objective fairness"
is inapplicable to an arm's length transaction.
137 Delaware was actually the first state to examine the concept of holding an
investment banker liable under negligent misrepresentation for an inaccurate fairness
opinion. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983), a minority shareholder attempted to hold an investment bank, among others,
liable for what he considered a misleading opinion rendered in a cash-out merger. In a
decision that was later withdrawn, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the bank had no
liability under a contractual theory. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Duffy stated
that the bank owed the minority shareholders a duty "to exercise reasonable care" in
rendering its opinion as to the fairness of the price offered and "any failure to perform in
accordance with that standard would make Lehman Brothers liable to the public
stockholders for negligent misrepresentation under the circumstances stated in the
Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d § 552." Weinberger No. 58, 1981 slip op. at 7, 8 (Del.
Feb. 9, 1982). In its final opinion in the case, the court omitted any discussion of the bank's
liability, leaving the issue thus unresolved-though the initial Duffy dissent served as a
catalyst for discussion of the concept in various circles. For a detailed analysis of the
Weinberger decision see Carol B. Haight, 7he Standard of Care Required of an Investment
Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 98 (1983). See also, Jan G. Deutsch, Weinberger v. UOP: Analysis of a
Dissent, 6 CORP. L. REv. 29 (1983); Marc I. Steinberg & Evalyn N. Lindahl, Note, The
Duty Owed to Minority Shareholders by an Investment Banker in Rendering a Fairness
Opinion, 13 S. REG. L.J. 80 (1985).
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was considered a startling development by numerous members of the legal
community.' 38 In Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.,139 a
special board committee, established to evaluate the fairness of a proposed
management buyout of Metromedia Inc., hired a pair of investment banks,
Shearson Lehman and Bear Steams & Co., to examine and opine on the
management's proposal.' 40 In a fairness opinion sent along with other proxy
materials to the shareholders who were being asked to approve the buyout, the
banks valued the business's assets at $1.114 billion. Within a year of the
transaction's completion, however, a portion of the business was sold for $2
billion, and, subsequently, the company received an additional $2.5 billion in
the sale of most of its remaining assets. 141 Distressed by these events, a former
shareholder sued the two investment banks for negligently undervaluing the
company's true worth. 142 The banks responded by claiming that because they
had not been retained by the shareholders themselves, there was no privity
relationship on which to base liability. The court, however, refusing to dismiss
the action on privity grounds, cited the Credit Alliance decision, 143 and ruled
that:
[Alssuming Shearson Lehman and Bear Steams were aware (as they must have
been) that their opinion would be used to help shareholders decide on the
fairness of [management's] stock offer, they can be liable to the
shareholders. 144
Because of the court's reference to Credit Alliance, Wells appears grounded
firmly on misrepresentation principles. Since the fairness opinion rendered by
the bankers was actually included in proxy materials sent to the
138 Herbert Hirsch, New York Appellate Court Creates New Right of Action by
Shareholders Against Investment Bankers, 1 INSIGHTS, Aug. 1987, at 37.
139 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8
(N.Y. 1988).
140 In return for its services, Shearson Lehman was to receive $750,000 for its
opinion, $685,000 in broker's fees, and an additional $3.2 million if the transaction was
completed. Bear Stearns was to receive $500,000 for its opinion and $2 million if the
merger was consummated. Id. at 2.
141 Id.
142 The plaintiff also claimed that the banks intentionally undervalued the company to
encourage the transaction's completion in order that they could collect on the larger
bonuses. Id. at 2.
143 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d
110 (N.Y. 1985).
144 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2 (citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483
N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985)).
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shareholders, 145 New York's "approaching privity" standard had impliedly
been met. 146 One commentator, however, has suggested that the opinion was
based on not only the newly expanded theory of negligent misrepresentation,
but went even beyond this principle to adopt an agency theory of liability. The
basic assumption underlying the application of an agency liability analysis to
investment banks retained by special board committees, at least in the
circumstance of a takeover, apparently relates to the theory that because such
committees are established to protect shareholder interests, services performed
for such committees by outside parties are purchased for shareholder benefit. In
Wells, prior to examining the banks' awareness that their report would be
examined by the shareholders, the court stated:
Shearson Lehman and Bear Stems make the untenable assertion that they
represented the officers and therefore were not in privity to the shareholders.
The officers, however, created a committee whose purpose was to serve the
shareholders by determining the fairness of the buyout. The committee hired
Shearson Lehman and Bear Steams. Anybody hired by the committee, aiding
in its endeavor, was actually retained to advise the shareholders. 147
According to Professor Coffee, this court came close to premising liability on
"agency theory: namely that those retained by a board or committee, at least in
the context of mergers and buyouts, are in indirect privity with the
shareholders and hence liable to them." 148 It must be noted, however, that, in
Wells, the shareholders actually received the controversial fairness opinion in
their proxy materials. Thus, actual shareholder reliance on the banks'
representations contained therein appears the primary vehicle for the imposition
of liability, as one cannot otherwise explain the court's citation of Credit
Alliance.
While investment bank liability predicated on agency principles was an
alternative seemingly suggested in Wells, agency theory was to provide the sole
basis for liability in Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co.,149 the most recent and
controversial New York case in the bank negligence area. The same New York
court that decided Wells stated that it would permit the imposition of liability
for negligently rendered advice on two investment banks in favor of
shareholders who never actually received nor even relied upon that advice.
Schneider involved an action by former shareholders of RJR Nabisco who
145 Id. at 1.
146 See Coffee, supra, note 79, at 5 (noting that Wells can be viewed as falling within
the Credit Alliance "approaching privity" standard); see also, Lund, supra note 80 at 613,
614.
147 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
148 Coffee, supra note 79, at 6.
149 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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alleged that the investment bankers who advised the Special Committee of the
board of directors, established to evaluate competing bids for the company, had
been negligent in rendering counsel and were consequently liable to the
shareholders for their actions. The shareholders complained that on the
recommendation of the banks the committee had prematurely terminated an
auction for the company, resulting in the sale of the business to Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co. for a less-than-adequate price. °50 The court began its
analysis of the liability issue by first dismissing any negligent misrepresentation
basis for liability. There was no Credit Alliance "approaching privity"
relationship between the shareholders and the bankers. As the court pointed
out:
No claim is made by the shareholders that any of them actually relied on any
advice the bankers gave the Special Committee concerning either the conduct
of the auction or the relative values of the competing bids. Nor is there any
allegation that any such advice was passed on, or intended to be passed on, to
any of the shareholders for the purpose of influencing them to take any
particular action in connection with the auction.15 1
What then followed was what several prominent take-over lawyers
characterized as a "new-and rather startling" approach for basing liability. 152
The court, expanding a point vaguely alluded to in Wells, suggested that there
was contractual privity between the shareholders and the banks through the
exercise of agency law principles. The Special Committee was established
specifically to protect the shareholders' interests in the auction. Consequently, a
principal/agent relationship existed, with the committee functioning explicitly
as the shareholders' agent.153 Having leap-frogged the traditional corporate law
principle not of an agency, but of a fiduciary obligation between board and
shareholder, the court then stated that:
[We do not see how it can be said that a duty of care owed by the bankers to
the Special Committee was not intended for the benefit of the
shareholders .... We do not think it a startling proposition that a principal is
in privity with his agent's agent, or with anyone else his agent deals with on
his behalf, so that a negligent statement made by a third person to an agent and
relied on by the agent to the principal's detriment is actionable by the
principal. 154
150 Id. at 571-72.
151 Id. at 574.
152 Herbert M. Wachtell et al., Investment Bank Liability to Shareholders in the Sale-
of-Control Contet, N.Y. L. Mar. 29, 1990, at 1.
153 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
154 Id. at 574-75 (citations omitted).
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The bankers who were in contractual privity with the Special Committee were
thus liable to the shareholders for any negligently rendered advice.
The imposition of agency principles on a liability action that centers on an
allegedly improper board decision was a remarkable departure from the
traditional model of corporate responsibility. The board is not the shareholders'
agent, but a fiduciary, and is empowered to act independently. As Professor
Coffee observed:
[D]irectors are not agents in the classic master/servant sense, but rather their
relationship is sui generis and involves a level of discretionary authority that
most agents do not possess. The business judgment rule reflects this broad
ambit of authority by conferring a level of immunity from negligence that no
other agent seemingly possesses. 155
In an attempt to punish and deter slothy bank behavior, the New York court
employed an unorthodox methodology that many warned would have a
profound and unsound impact on the laws of corporate governance. 156
In an effort to blunt this criticism, the court limited its application of the
agency concept to the extraordinary circumstance of the sale of a corporation.
The court wrote:
[The] sale of the control of a corporation is not corporate business of the type
governed by traditional principles of corporate governance, and... the Special
Committee stood in a relationship to the shareholders different from that which
normally obtains between a corporation's board and shareholders. The Special
Committee's purpose was not to judge transactions accruing to the benefit of
the corporate treasury; nor was it concerned with any matters affecting RJR's
internal affairs. Rather its purpose was to advise the shareholders with respect
to a transaction that contemplated RJR's demise and whose end and aim was to
obtain for the shareholders the highest possible price for their stock. In this
"buyout" context, if something less than the highest possible price was
obtained, the loss was sustained by the shareholders, not the corporation, and,
for that reason, we are of the view that the relationship between the
shareholders and the Special Committee was essentially that of principal and
agent on which principles of corporate law should not be superimposed. 157
155 Coffee supra note 79, at 6. Coffee in this article was commenting on the lower
court decision that was the basis for the Schneider appeal. The agency theory was initially
developed at the Supreme Court level and adopted by the court of appeals in its decision,
though with some limitation.
156 See Barbara Franklin, On Sh1aky Ground; Survival of Shareholders, Claim in RIR
Sale is Unsettling, N.Y. L.J. Oct. 5, 1989, at 5 (dealing with lower court ruling but
argument still applies to appellate court decision); Coffee, supra note 79, at 6; Wachtell et
al., supra note 152, at 4.
157 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (citing Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.,
514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y.
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This limitation left most commentators unimpressed. Under the agency
principles expounded by the court, any negligent third-party advisor to a board
could be liable directly to shareholders in a sale-of-control context.
Shareholders needed no longer demonstrate reliance and "the reasonable
foreseeability and intention of that reliance by the third-party advisor." 158 The
court had abandoned completely the liability-limiting role of privity
traditionally applied. This highly suspect approach created a "justifiable fear of
over expansive liability" for third parties fulfilling an advisory role in mergers
and takeovers. 159
While prior to Wells a shareholder action against an investment banker for
a negligently rendered fairness opinion had practically no chance of success,
following Schneider, liability for the negligent banker appeared almost
inescapable. Clearly, the most startling feature of Schneider is the fact that no
shareholders ever suggested that they actually relied on the bankers' advice,
nor did they even claim that any of that advice was ever shown to them. To the
contrary, the court expressly noted that the shareholders were merely expected
to follow "passively" the Special Committee's recommendations. 160 Any
attempt to conform the decision with pre-existing third-party advisor liability
concepts simply fails, as the opinion is devoid of any facts upon which third-
party negligent misrepresentation principles logically apply. Thus, one must
view the case not as the logical outgrowth of developing misrepresentation
theory, but as a radical and obviously controversial injection of agency law into
the third-party liability arena. Although the case expands on the recent trend of
liberalizing negligence actions against advisory professionals, because of its
unusual approach to traditional corporate governance theory and highly vocal
attendant criticism, it is unlikely that the approach will be adopted by very
many courts. Nonetheless, the fact that it would allow a banker to be liable to a
shareholder for a negligent fairness opinion is very much worthy of
consideration.
Despite the unusual tangent taken by Schneider, shortly thereafter, in what
is the most recent bank accountability case, a Rhode Island federal district
court, deciding a Wells-like negligent misrepresentation claim, explicitly
recognized potential investment bank liability to shareholders, utilizing the
Restatement of Torts' "actual foreseeability" approach. In Dowling v.
1988)). The court appears to be responding to Professor Coffee's article which appeared
before the court's decision was reached.
158 Lund, supra note 80 at 619; see also, Edward Brodsky, Investment Banker Liability
to Shareholders, N.Y. L., May 3, 1990, at 3; Wachtel, et al., supra note 152, at 4.
159 Lund, supra note 80, at 620.
160 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
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Narragansett Capital Corp. ,161 several former Narragansett shareholders, who
dissented from a sale of the corporation's assets to Monarch Capital
Corporation, brought suit against, among others, the investment bankers hired
by the Narragansett board to opine on the fairness of the transaction. The
shareholders charged that the resulting purchase price was inadequate and that
the Salomon Brothers, Inc. fairness opinion, which accompanied the proxy
statement, negligently undervalued the company's worth. 162 Dismissing
assertions that dissenting shareholders cannot logically assert reliance upon an
investment banker's advice and that fairness letters merely constitute
unactionable opinion, the court proceeded to consider whether the bankers
owed the shareholders any duty of care. 163
After examining Ultramares and its progeny, the court explained that those
cases imposing third-party liability upon financial advisors generally involved
situations in which the plaintiffs comprised a limited class of persons whose
reliance was actually foreseen. 164 Finding the Dowling facts to present such a
pattern, the court explained that the opinion produced by Salomon Brothers
was "patently intended to guide [the] shareholders," whose reliance thereon
was actually foreseeable. 165 The court explicitly adopted the approach
suggested by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and held that,
under the Dowling facts, the investment banker's duty to employ reasonable
care in rendering its opinion extended to the shareholders. 166 The bank was
thus potentially liable directly to the shareholders for any negligent errors
contained within its fairness opinion.
Shortly before the release of the Narragansett Capital decision, a
California federal district court similarly permitted a negligent
misrepresentation claim to be brought against an investment bank in Mein v.
King.167 There, the plaintiffs, shareholders of Informix Corporation, were
suing, among others, Hambrecht & Quist, a San Francisco investment bank,
who had authored a fairness opinion included in a proxy statement prepared in
161 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990) (containing allegations of securities laws
violations in addition to claims of negligent misrepresentation).
162 Id. at 1110.
163 Id. at 1125.
164 Id. The Dowling court paid particular attention to the analysis developed in Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552). Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1125. See supra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Rusch Factors.
165 735 F. Supp. at 1125.
166 Id. The dispute in Dowling involved a motion to dismiss and after the court denied
the defendant's motion, the parties eventually settled the contest, thereby precluding the
necessity of a final judgement on the issue of the bank's asserted negligence. Id.
167 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 1990).
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connection with a proposed merger between Informix and another company,
Innovative Software. The shareholders alleged that the proxy statement was
"overly favorable and deliberately misleading as to the potential success of the
merger." 168 Denying the defendants' motions to dismiss, the court allowed the
negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed against the bank. 169 The court,
citing International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,170 the
1986 California decision extending negligent misrepresentation liability to
accountants on the "reasonable foreseeability" approach, ruled that
"independent auditors owe a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs
who rely on negligently prepared and issued unqualified and audited financial
statements." 171 Because the bank had purportedly "culpably participated in the
preparation of the allegedly false and misleading proxy statement," the judge
denied dismissal of the negligence misrepresentation claim against Hambrecht
& Quist, stating that the bank "owed a duty to all plaintiffs who relied on the
statement." 172 Although the court gave no explicit reasoning for its decision to
allow liability, its discussion of Butler suggests that it had adopted that case's
"reasonably foreseeable" approach and extended it to govern both accountants
and investment bankers. 173 Bank liability, based on the ruling, seemed likely.
The Wells court's extension of negligent misrepresentation liability to
investment bankers under a weakened privity analysis, followed, of course, by
its agency liability decision in Schneider, when combined with the Rhode
Island Narragansett Capital decision and the California Klein ruling, suggests a
dramatic shift in the law of bank negligence responsibility. 174 Whether the
basis for liability lies under negligent misrepresentation principles or even the
controversial agency analysis, the fact remains clear that courts and the
shareholding public have a new tool for remedying slothy bank behavior. No
longer need scienter be demonstrated, only negligence. Of course, this change
16 8 Id. at 95,602.
16 9 Id. at 95,602, 95,615 (case involved allegations of several securities law violations
against numerous parties in addition to the negligent misrepresentation claim).
170 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, at * 30 (Cal. Aug. 27, 1992); see supra notes 108-
11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Butler.
171 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) 95,002 at 95,615 (citations
omitted).
172 Id.
173 For further discussion of Klein, see Martin, supra note 30. In light of Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., No. S017199, 1992 WL 205698, which overruled Butler, it appears that in
California, investment bank liability must now be based on an actual forseeability approach
rather than on the reasonable forseeability analytic standard applied in Butler.
174 But see In re Shoe-Town, Inc. No. 9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *19 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 12, 1990) (dismissing shareholder claim against investment bank and holding that
investment bank hired by management to render fairness opinion on going private
transaction was an agent of management and owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders).
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in approach raises some fundamental questions. Will this extension of liability
result in better bank behavior and, consequently, fairer transactions for the
shareholder? Put another way, will the benefits to shareholders and our market
system generally, resulting from this new approach, outweigh any potential
costs? Is there, in fact, any benefit to be derived ultimately from this
development? If not, is there any other way to ensure bank probity, or should
this so-called problem even be a concern?
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE EXTENSION OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILTY
Although theoretically, under the fundamental principles of tort law,
extension of negligence liability to a party will deter careless behavior and
consequently produce greater societal benefit, this principle is unworkable in its
application to the fairness opinion produced by an investment bank. The
negligence approach, advanced by both the courts and commentators as the
panacea to faulty valuations, is flawed both economically and juridically.
Ideally, the imposition of negligence liability would force a bank to render
an opinion as to the fairness of a given transaction only after extensive and
careful study of the deal's value. It is argued that the lower the standard of
culpability, the greater the probity of the potentially liable party. If one is held
not to a scienter standard, but negligence, one is expected to act in a more
responsible manner. Most commentators have no argument with this approach.
Their major concern seems to be with the development of a consistent valuation
scheme, structural considerations hindering an independent evaluation, and
consequent judicial caution in approaching the question of negligence. 175 This
"solution" is conceptually appealing and "morally" acceptable, but, in the final
analysis, unsound, of little benefit, and ultimately harmful to the injured
party-the shareholder.
Theoretically, the negligence approach will produce more "accurate"
opinions. However, fundamental economic analysis suggests that, concurrent
with this benefit, a number of unpleasant costs will result. If bankers are to be
held responsible for the far-ranging (and expensive) consequences of a
negligently rendered opinion, the risk of this liability will force higher rates for
the delivery of the opinion itself. The bank, as a well-known deep pocket, will
become, in effect, an insurer of the fairness of the transaction, and obviously
will have to charge fees commensurate with the increased risk of liability
exposure. As insurance companies charge more for insuring higher risk
activities, so will the banks. How much more remains to be seen, but, given
the enormous size of the transactions involved and huge consequent exposure,
it is not unlikely that fees will escalate considerably. And who in the end must
pay these higher fees?-the shareholders. Although the corporations engaging
175 See supra note 136.
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the banks ostensibly pay their fees, in the final analysis it is the shareholders
who must pay for their services by a reduced corporate asset base, or, in the
sale of the company, a smaller price to be received for their interest after the
banks' fees are deducted. Although the banks may still seek indemnification for
liability from the companies who have retained them, it is unlikely, given the
potential cost involved, that full indemnification will be provided, 176 and, more
importantly, a good argument may be made for denying indemnification as has
been suggested in actions arising out of the federal securities laws. 177
However, whether the banks are indemnified or not, the cost of a fairness
opinion to the shareholders will escalate, whether the bank, or ultimately the
corporation itself, must pay for damages arising out of a negligently rendered
opinion.
In addition to making fairness opinions more expensive, imposition of
negligence liability will also make them less informative. An individual who is
to be held liable for inaccuracies in his speech is most likely to meet the threat
by simply saying less. It is hard to be found responsible for the consequences
of that which you have never said. The choice between saying much while
paying more and speaking little while parting with less is an obvious one.
Imposing a negligence standard will only cause the banks to write opinions that
are less conclusive, more vague, qualified, and of less value to anyone reading
and relying on them. 178 Liability may breed caution, but caution may also
breed silence. The cost of prodding a liability-conscious bank to say more will
obviously result in a higher fee to be paid. The stockholder is caught in -an
untenable position as a result. He can, in effect, pay more to protect not his
interest, but the pockets of his directors, or pay less and receive less
"pertinent" information, if that is in fact the purpose of a fairness opinion. A
similar problem exists in the accountancy field in which negligent
misrepresentation liability is better established and more advanced.
Accountants' opinion letters have become, with the imposition of liability,
more expensive and less extensive. 179 Indeed, even the legal profession itself
176 See Giuffra, supra note 12, at 140-41.
177 See Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(indemnification of investment banker would encourage flouting the policy of the Securities
Act), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)..
178 See supra note 10 for an example of a typically vague and otherwise uninformative
fairness opinion.
179 For an economic analysis of the impact of negligent liability on accountants see
Thomas E. Bilek, Accountants'Liability to the Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabresi
Approach, 39 Sw. LJ. 689 (1985). The increase in the number of judgments against
accounting firms has apparently forced many of the smaller firms out of the auditing
business. Those larger firms that remain take a number of steps to reduce liability. They
have raised their fees to cover the cost of liability insurance as well as to take advantage of
the reduced competition. Additionally, firms have become more cautious. In deciding
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has become concerned with potential third-party liability for its own written
opinions. A number of bar groups have proposed new forms of legal opinions
that are much more cautious and limited in terms of their scope. The language
of disclaimer abounds throughout the documents.180
Although the imposition of liability will probably inspire more care in the
banking community, will the resulting higher costs and less information
dispensed be worth this potential benefit? If fairness opinions did in fact play a
critical role in the evolution of a particular transaction by a shareholder, then
perhaps one could argue that they would. But it is not clear who, other than the
board which utilizes such opinions for liability limitation, actually bases an
investment decision on them (although for liability purposes, most shareholders
would ostensibly claim that they did). The surge in the sheer numbers of
opinions issued took place following Van Gorkom. If these opinions had been
so critical to a shareholder's decisionmaking process prior to that case, then no
corresponding increase in opinions rendered would have been noted.
A distinction may also be made between the accountant's report and a
fairness opinion. A shareholder makes an investment decision by evaluating the
financial condition of the enterprise and reaching his own conclusion based on
his independent judgment. Essential to the integrity of the decisionmaking
process is accurate financial information. An accountant's opinion is designed
to assure the reader that the company's financials were prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting procedures and were honestly prepared to
the best of the accountant's knowledge. Assuring the investor that the
accountant's opinion is accurate by the imposition of negligence liability might
be worth the added expense. Making an investment decision without accurate
numbers is as hazardous as driving an automobile with one's eyes closed. The
same may not, on the other hand, be true for a fairness opinion. A fairness
opinion is simply one party's conclusory judgment as to the validity of
another's conclusion on a financial matter. An opinion is only as important as
the faith one has in the judgment of the opining party. An accountant's report
deals with the tangible, and accuracy as to the tangible is obviously valuable.
whether to perform an audit, a firm will look carefully at a company's financial records;
some high risk businesses have difficulty finding an auditor at all. They are also offering
fewer services for new audit clients, often refusing to show clients ways to improve
financial and billing systems in fear of potential liability should their suggestions somehow
result in loss to the client's shareholders. Another tactic is the use of an engagement letter,
which outlines the scope of the CPA's job and often includes disclaimers specifying the
appropriate use of the audit information. Lee Berton, Legal-Liability Awards Are
Frightening Smaller Firm Away From Audits, WALL Sr. J., Mar., 3, 1992, at Bi; see also
Dennis Wyss, Lawsuit, OUrLOOK, Summer, 1987, at 26.
180 See Florida Bar Opinion Committee, Report on Standards for Opinions of Florida
Counsel of the Special Committee on Opinion Standards of the Florida Bar Business Law
Section, 46 BUS. LAW. 1410 (1991).
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But, is "accuracy" as to the validity of one's opinion worth the increased cost
with less information? Probably not. Critical to this analysis is obviously the
reliability of the process by which a banker forms an opinion. And, as
discussed earlier, the variability of the analytic process combines with
structural considerations inherent to the investment banking business that
prevent truly independent evaluation, to cloud any image of reliability. Why
not then "fix" the valuation process to ensure accuracy? If the procedure could
be properly policed, could the benefits derived from an "accurate" valuation
process outweigh any costs occasioned by negligence liability? Unfortunately
not. This assumes that a "proper" valuation procedure may be developed,
which is an unrealistic goal.
To impose a negligence liability regime on the investment banking industry
first requires the development of a definition of what is "appropriate" conduct.
Each of the commentators who have examined this phenomenon have called for
the development of some universally accepted standard or standards for the
preparation of a fairness opinion. One has even suggested the creation of a
model statute defining what bank probity ought to entail. 181 If standards for
other professionals can be developed, why not do the same for the banking
business? This approach is well-intentioned but terribly flawed. To have a
standard by which to measure bank conduct, one must first reach some
agreement as to what that standard should be. This cannot and will not occur.
First, as Professors Bebchuk and Kahan have pointed out, no one has yet
even to agree what a "fair price" is deflnitionally. 182 What is fair, and to
whom? The concept is amorphous. If no one can agree what "fairness" stands
for, how can we judge what is fair or unfair? Only hindsight, always 20/20,
will tell. Second, and more importantly, there is no uniformly accepted
valuation procedure by which the banks may arrive at a "fair price." As noted
earlier, there are at least four widely recognized and commonly utilized
valuation processes. Each of these, used either independently or in
combination, will yield very different results. It is difficult to suggest that any
of these approaches is either totally without merit or the panacea. Each has
benefits and each has equally significant disadvantages. That is probably why
the better approach is some sort of combination of processes. Developing a
uniform and proportional "combination," however, may also prove to be an
elusive effort. Each industry, indeed each company, has its own set of unique
problems that prevents application of some standardized approach. The
variables that comprise the various valuation processes are themselves often
highly subjective, leaving much room for a bank to maneuver.
181 Schuldt, supra note 136, at 115-19. For discussion of proposed standards
governing investment banking, see supra note 136.
182 See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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Given the fact that each approach is highly supportable and each is subject
to various drawbacks, we are left with a juridical problem in creating a system
of negligence liability. The development of such a system requires first the
creation of some notion of "reasonable" conduct, deviation from which is
negligent.
Development of such a concept first requires some sort of agreement as to
what constitutes reasonable behavior-that is, what approach (or approaches) to
the valuation conundrum is the most thoughtful or precise? However, for the
reasons stated ad infinitum (and ad nauseam) by those familiar with the field,
the use of any or all the methods described above may be either fully
justifiable, or, as each may produce radically differing results, utterly
meaningless. Thus, we are faced with a valuation universe that will always
produce highly varied results. But, as an asset can, in the final analysis, have
but one value, each of the values "rationally" developed under accepted
procedures that does not meet that one "right" price is thus incorrect. But was
the process that created them negligent? Obviously not. If all methods used
may be justified, and the "best"-that is, the one that produces the accurate
result-is only determinable if the business in question is resold within some
short period following the valuation, how will a court, faced with determining
the existence of negligent conduct, be able to act in a fair and defensible
manner? We are faced with two unpleasant prospects: (1) proof of the existence
of a higher value than that opined on by the bank will always compel a finding
of negligence, or (2) if any of the various accepted methods were used, then,
absent absolutely atrocious behavior (which would probably end up proving to
be fraudulent and thus actionable under other approaches) a court would never
find negligence. Imposition of negligence liability sets the unwelcome stage for
either the finding of universal negligence, or universal reasonable conduct.
With the existence of so many acceptable valuation strategies, unfortunately, no
other result appears likely. Those who attack the conclusions of a fairness
opinion as "negligent" really have no strong argument against the "process"
used for forming the opinion; they are really only quarreling with the result. 183
But to draw a parallel with the business judgment rule, as long as the process
remains sound, then the result, no matter how awful, should be protected.
Where numerous methods of valuation exist and no clear standard exists, or
can exist, for determining the most acceptable method, short of hindsight, we
will never develop that standard of "reasonableness" required for the proper
application of a negligence standard. The concept of "making banks more
183 In actuality, they are really attacking the perceived "collusion" between the
bankers and management that results in valuations they feel to be inadequate opined of as
fair. "Collusion" is difficult to prove, however, while simple negligence is a much more
promising basis for recovering the difference between what they received for their shares
and what they felt they ought to have received. Therefore banker misconduct is not called
fraudulent, but criticized as sloppy.
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responsible" by imposing negligence liability on them for inaccurate fairness
opinions is both ineffectual and counterproductive.
IV. THE "SOLUTION" TO THE FAIRNESS PROBLEM
If the imposition of negligence liability will not lead to bank probity, then
what will? To find some solution to this problem, we must first re-examine the
whole purpose for fairness opinions. Were they developed to create a better
informed shareholder universe? Hardly. The tremendous demand for them that
was created following the Van Gorkom ruling did not develop on the basis of
shareholder interest. No mobs of shareholders formed outside corporate
boardrooms demanding the employment of a neutral investment banker to
protect their interests from the inept decisions of their boards. No shareholder
resolutions were formulated calling for the engagement of, to use a popular
cliche, these financial white knights. It was the boards themselves that sought
out the banks' services for their own interests, not those of the stockholders.
The fairness opinion acted to insulate a board from liability for a decision later
judged ill-conceived. The opinion following Van Gorkom was really only to act
as a "type of insurance" to protect against board negligence liability to the
shareholders. 184 Given this illustrious history, the fact that the valuation
process is so amorphous, and the banks themselves, due to structural
considerations pointed out earlier, are pliable, is it any wonder why the entire
process has come under attack?
Following the liability-imposing Van Gorkom decision, corporate directors
faced a difficult dilemma when called upon to approve a corporate purchase or
sale. If the price they voted to accept was later judged inadequate, they could
incur significant liability unless they demonstrated that they were informed
when making their decision.185 The fairness opinion provided the proverbial
"easy out." Once a price had been established, given the flexible valuation
process and an investment banking community eager to please corporate
management, a liability-limiting opinion was easily obtained. The ease of
acquisition would of course, not come without its costs. Yet, for the added
expense, the board's personal wealth could remain intact. This phenomenon,
while preserving director capital, did little to protect that of the shareholders.
The cost of obtaining the opinion was simply passed on to the stockholders in
the form of a smaller corporate asset base or lower price per share to be
received at time of sale. The directors benefitted from the opinion, but did the
shareholders gain anything from the transaction? Not at all. The opinion,
drafted to suit the needs of the directors, offered little in terms of substantive
184 Fisehel, supra note 17, at 1453.
185 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del. 1985).
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value for the stockholders. As Professor Fischel astutely predicted at the time
of the Van Gorkom ruling:
Shareholders are the biggest losers after [Van Gorkom]. Firms will have no
difficulty finding an "expert" who is willing to state that a price at a significant
premium over the market price in an arm's-length transaction is "fair." ( wish
someone would pay me several hundred thousand dollars to state that $55 is
greater than $35.) But the cost of obtaining such an opinion is, in effect, a
judicially imposed tax on fundamental corporate charges. 186
If the process of valuation could be manipulated (by choosing the proper
result-bearing technique) to "backstop" a board's initial judgment on value,
then all that resulted from the process was an additional cost borne by the
shareholders with no corresponding benefit for them. Why not then have the
directors themselves pay the cost of the fairness opinion? The result would be
highly problematic. First of all, because of the tremendous expense required to
procure these opinions, either directors fees would have to be increased to the
point of irrationality or no one could be found to serve as a director. More
importantly, if the goal of the court in Van Gorkom was to create an
"informed" board process that would result in the shareholders receiving more
for their investment, 187 this solution, other than protecting the board, still does
nothing to meet the court's, and in fact the investing public's, concerns.
In reality, the shareholders, most of whom in today's market are
sophisticated institutional investors, do not rely on these suspect opinions. And
with popular attention also focused on the "fairness for hire" syndrome, it is
doubtful that even individual investors actually fall prey to casual reliance.1 88
Although the imposition of negligence liability would provide them with at
least one group from whom to seek financial redress for a retrospectively bad
director decision, is it worth the cost? Probably not. If liability were imposed,
the banks would say less and charge more. And, as noted earlier, either the
courts would have a difficult time ever finding negligence because of the
difficulty of developing a "reasonableness" standard or, following a universal
186 Fischel, supra note 17, at 1453.
187As the court stated:
A director's duty to inform himself in preparation for a decision
derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation
and shareholders.... Representation of the financial interests of others
imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to
proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type and
under the circumstances present here.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (citations omitted).
188 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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imposition of liability by the courts, the fees charged for such opinions would
eventually equal the cost of such liability, or force banks out of the opinion
business altogether, creating a zero-sum game for the shareholders.
To develop some solution to this difficult state of affairs, we must first
examine the reasoning that lay behind the judicial imposition of the fairness
opinion "requirement." Ideally, the presence of an independent third-party
valuation expert would ensure that the decision the board had reached as to
price was fair. This was to protect shareholder wealth. Unfortunately, the third
party proved neither independent, nor a particularly precise arbiter of value. In
an attempt to force the banks to conform to their judicially created roles, it has
been suggested that the imposition of negligence liability will bring about
independence and valuation precision. As discussed, this is an unworkable
approach. In the final analysis, the fairness opinion only leads to increased
transaction costs that are ultimately paid by the stockholders without
corresponding benefit. If such opinions act merely as self-serving shields of
director behavior and are not true indicators of value, then what force exists to
promote fair value for the stockholders? The simple operation of ordinary
market forces acts to ensure value. Opinions on value are just that-opinions.
Value is simply what one individual is willing to pay for a particular asset at a
given point in time. Investors are aware of the problems inherent in fairness
opinions-that is why the price ultimately received in a corporate control
contest is often higher than that initially proposed. They make their own
judgments on value when they decide to buy or sell based on their own
conclusions on the financial information presented to them. It really matters
little whether the opinion calls a price adequate or not. If the investors conclude
that a price is fair, they will buy or sell on their own initiative. The market
itself acts to determine price adequacy. A suspect fairness opinion adds nothing
to the process. 189 It is as necessary to valuation analysis as is the appendix to
the human digestive system. Consequently, the Van Gorkom "requirement" of
a fairness opinion should be abandoned, along with any attendant negligence
liability. Other than producing profits for the investment banking industry, it
produces no benefit for the shareholders. If its real purpose is to protect
corporate directors, such could be just as easily accomplished through the
procurement of an insurance policy. To promote shareholder value, judicial
integrity, and market efficiency, any sort of legal demand for such meaningless
and value-appropriating opinions must be eliminated.
Elimination of the "requirement" and any accompanying liability will not
end the use of the fairness opinion entirely. Prior to Van Gorkom, such
189 See In Re Armsted Indus., Inc. Litig., No. 8224, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116, at
*21 (Aug. 10, 1987) ("A decent respect for reality forces one to admit that such advice is
frequently a pale substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant
market can provide.").
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opinions were utilized in a variety of transactions. The result, however, will be
that these opinions will be viewed for what they really are-simply one
individual's view on value, to be discounted by how compromised that view
may be due to relational factors. This is probably what occurs anyway under
the present regime, but because of fear of liability, at great cost. Legal rules
that fail to recognize this reality accomplish little and may even prove counter-
productive to the goal of protecting shareholder capital. The fairness opinion
"rule," mainly the product of judicial formalism without any corresponding
advantage, must be eliminated from the legal landscape if we are ever to
accomplish maximum economic and societal benefit.

